Akron Law Review
Volume 55

Issue 1

Article 1

You Have the Duty to Remain Silent: How Workplace Gag Rules
Frustrate Police Accountability
Frank D. LoMonte
Jessica Terkovich

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the First Amendment Commons

Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will
be important as we plan further development of our repository.
Recommended Citation
LoMonte, Frank D. and Terkovich, Jessica () "You Have the Duty to Remain Silent: How Workplace
Gag Rules Frustrate Police Accountability," Akron Law Review: Vol. 55: Iss. 1, Article 1.
Available at: https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol55/iss1/1
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at
IdeaExchange@UAkron, the institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of
IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please contact mjon@uakron.edu,
uapress@uakron.edu.

LoMonte and Terkovich: Your Have the Duty to Remain Silent

YOU HAVE THE DUTY TO REMAIN SILENT:
HOW WORKPLACE GAG RULES FRUSTRATE POLICE
ACCOUNTABILITY
Frank D. LoMonte * and Jessica Terkovich **

I.
II.

Introduction ......................................................................2
Freedom of Speech and the Government Workplace...........6
A. Government Gatekeeping: Regulator Versus
Supervisor ..................................................................6
B. NTEU: Prior Restraints Don’t Work at Work ...............8
III. The Importance of Access ...............................................11
IV. What Courts Have Said: Untie the Gags...........................16
A. Uniformed not Uninformed: Courts Value Officers’
Contributions to Public Discourse..............................16
B. Fatally Flawed: Gag Policies Flunk Test of Vagueness,
Overbreadth, Unbridled Discretion ............................18
V.
Putting Police Policies Under Surveillance.......................23
A. Blanket Prohibitions on Speaking Without Approval..24
B. Policies Lacking Clarity That Exist in a Constitutional
Gray Zone ................................................................28
C. Narrowly Tailored Policies........................................34
VI. The Argument for Handcuffing Officer Speech ................36
A. Less Speech-Restrictive Remedies Exist ....................39
B. Supervisors Have Adequate Speech-Specific
Enforcement Power...................................................40
VII. Prior Restraints Do Not Serve or Protect: A Way Forward 42
*
Professor & Director of the Joseph L. Brechner Center for Freedom of Information at the University
of Florida in Gainesville, Florida; B.A., 1992, Political Science, Georgia State University; J.D. (Order
of the Coif), 2000, University of Georgia School of Law.
**
B.A., 2018, Criminology & Law, University of Florida; J.D. (anticipated) 2022, University of
Florida Levin College of Law. The authors gratefully acknowledge the invaluable research assistance
of Adriana Merino in compiling and analyzing the police department policies on which Sec. V is
based.

1

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron,

1

Akron Law Review, Vol. 55 [], Iss. 1, Art. 1

2

AKRON LAW R EVIEW

I.

[55:1

INTRODUCTION

When reporter Sara Koenig of the acclaimed podcast Serial sought
to tell the story of how Cleveland police fatally shot a 12-year-old boy
playing with a toy gun in a city park, the only representative of the
Cleveland Police Department who would speak to her was the head of the
patrolman’s union, Steve Loomis. 1 Acknowledging that Loomis’ opinion
might not be representative of the rank-and-file officers’ views, Koenig
explained to listeners that “no other Cleveland officers were permitted to
talk to us on the record.” 2
This response—that police officers are forbidden from discussing
anything work-related with the news media—has become a staple of daily
routine for journalists. One survey of reporters who regularly cover law
enforcement agencies found that a media-relations officer had blocked
57% from getting an interview with a police department employee. 3
“Gagging” America’s police officers prevents journalists and their
audiences from hearing the perspective of frontline law enforcement
officers, whose perspective is especially relevant now, when policing is
under unprecedented scrutiny.
Police officers’ ability to tell their own stories has undeniable value.
The public needs to hear why officers make their decisions without
filtering through a public-relations officer who lacks firsthand knowledge
and may be inclined to apply spin to the facts. 4 As with any highly

1. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Video Shows Cleveland Officer Shot Boy in 2 Seconds, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 26, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/27/us/video-shows-cleveland-officer-shot tamir-rice-2-seconds-after-pulling-up-next-to-him.html [https://perma.cc/7LJK-AJAU].
2. Serial,
Misdemeanor,
Meet
Mr.
Lawsuit, S ERIAL (Sept. 27,
2018),
https://serialpodcast.org/season-three/3/misdemeanor-meet-mr-lawsuit
[https://perma.cc/2YBEMV38].
3. C AROLYN S. C ARLSON & P AYMON KASHANI , MEDIATED ACCESS: C RIME R EPORTERS’
P ERCEPTIONS OF P UBLIC INFORMATION OFFICERS’ MEDIA C ONTROL EFFORTS, USE OF S OCIAL
MEDIA, HANDLING OF B ODY C AMERA F OOTAGE AND PUBLIC R ECORDS, S OC’Y P RO. JOURNALISTS 3
(Mar. 2016), https://www.spj.org/pdf/sunshineweek/crime-reporters-survey-report.pdf.
4. See Ryan J. Foley, Video Evidence Increasingly Disproves Police Narratives, ASSOCIATED
P RESS (June 9, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/us-news-ap-top-news-mn-state-wire-pa-state-wi re police-a172fb01bdb74b4159b39da390d9e79e
[https://perma.cc/89TY-ZTAS]
(documenting
instances in which video evidence debunked official press statements from police agencies
downplaying severity of violent behavior by officers, “fueling mistrust and embarrassing agencies
that made misleading or incomplete statements that painted their actions in a far more favorabl e
light”); David DeBolt, Bay Area Police Shooting Videos Follow Same Recipe; Critics Call It ‘Slick
Marketing,’ MERCURY NEWS (May 18, 2021 3:50 PM), https://www.mercurynews.com/
2021/05/16/police-pr-video-machine-criticized/ [https://perma.cc/7DPT-LJ5D] (describing how law
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scrutinized public employee, police officers may be wrongfully suspected
of misconduct, and officers’ ability to explain themselves through the
news media can help dispel suspicion and vindicate reputations. 5
Transparency is widely recognized as a core value in restoring strained
public trust in law enforcement, 6 but a police department that refuses to
make its officers accessible to answer questions is hardly transparent.
Although courts have acknowledged that police, “like teachers and
lawyers, are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional
rights,” agency gag orders have historically shackled officers’ right to free
speech, and in many cases, clearly overstep both First Amendment
boundaries and principles of responsible governance. 7 To cite just one
example among many, a directive on the books at Ohio’s Columbus Police
Department tells officers that, even when they are off duty, they must
refrain from expressing any opinions about police department policy or
voicing criticism of the department or any of its employees. 8
Restrictive speech policies can stifle whistleblowing—and when one
whistleblower is punished, an unmistakable message of intimidation is
sent to other would-be leakers. 9 When Minneapolis Police Officer Colleen
Ryan was pseudonymously quoted in a national magazine complaining
about the department’s toxic culture after one of her fellow officers killed
George Floyd, an unarmed Black man, while arresting him for a petty
crime, the police department tracked Ryan down and disciplined her for
enforcement agencies contract with marketing firms to produce selectively edited videos “to create
an early narrative and spin the story in their favor while keeping raw footage out of public view”).
5. For example, when an Indiana police officer was ordered reinstated to his job after a review
board concluded that he had been unfairly labeled as mentally unfit for duty, police department policy
kept him from telling his side of the story to the local media. FOP, Merit Commission Defend Decision
to Reinstate Officer Accused of Unfit for Duty, WAVE 3 NEWS (Nov. 24, 2013, 1:10 AM),
https://www.wave3.com/story/23651754/fop-merit-commission-defend-decision-to-reinstateofficer/ [https://perma.cc/JD57-NLL5].
6. See Joshua Chanin & Salvador Espinosa, Examining the Determinants of Police
Department Transparency: The View of Police Executives, 27 C RIM. JUST. P OL’Y R EV. 498, 499
(2016) (explaining that recognized virtues of transparency in criminal justice include fortifying trust
and accountability, and promoting dialogue and increasing public involvement in agency decisionmaking); see also Imani J. Jackson & Frank LoMonte, Policing Transparency, 44 HUM. R TS. 12, 12
(2020) (“Access to documents and data from law enforcement agencies enables the public and press
to discharge essential oversight functions.”).
7. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967).
8. C OLUMBUS P OLICE DEP’T, MEDIA R ELATIONS AND P UBLIC APPEARANCES 10.13, § II.D
(2021).
9. See Robert E. Drechsel, The Declining First Amendment Rights of Government News
Sources: How Garcetti v. Ceballos Threatens the Flow of Newsworthy Information, 16 C OMMC’N. L.
& P OL’Y 129, 139 (2011) (asserting that “[i]f government employees can be disciplined without First
Amendment limits for job related speech, government employers now have another tool to
discourage, intimidate and punish whistleblowers and leakers”).
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speaking to the media without approval. 10 (It is no small irony that the
officer convicted of murdering Floyd, Derek Chauvin, largely avoided
discipline over a checkered career of violent run-ins with citizens, while
the department acted swiftly to penalize speech perceived as harming the
agency’s image. 11 ) When law enforcement agencies silence officers, they
disparately impact would-be dissenters like Colleen Ryan, whose
opinions break from the “party line.”
Police officers are not the only ones who suffer under repressive
speech policies: The public suffers when police are unable to speak out on
matters of public concern, including issues within their departments or,
more broadly, within the profession of policing. The Supreme Court has
recognized “the importance of promoting the public’s interest in receiving
the well-informed views of government employees engaging in civic
discussion.” 12 Yet workplace policies that prevent law enforcement
officers from discussing their inside knowledge with the public remain
widely in force and unchallenged across the country.
When journalists cannot speak directly with officers involved in
newsworthy events, public relations operations within police departments
fill the information vacuum and affirmatively push out their version of the
story—at times bypassing journalists altogether and taking advantage of
social media channels. 13 This practice allows police agencies to reframe
the narrative in the guise of transparency.
This article will examine the legality of commonplace policies in
effect at law enforcement agencies throughout the United States,
10. See Libor Jany, Minneapolis Police Chief Reprimands Officer Who Anonymously Detailed
Department’s ‘Toxic Culture,’ S TAR TRIB. (Jan. 8, 2021, 9:22 PM), https://www.startribune.com/
minneapolis-police-chief-reprimands-officer-who-anonymously-detailed-department-s-toxicculture/600008451/ [https://perma.cc/9FL6-Z69C] (describing how a Minneapolis officer, Colleen
Ryan, was reprimanded after being identified as the anonymous leaker who contacted a reporter for
GQ to give an interview about her concerns with the tolerance for violent misconduct within her
agency).
11. Dakin Andone, Hollie Silverman & Melissa Alonso, The Minneapolis Police Officer Who
Knelt on George Floyd’s Neck Had 18 Previous Complaints Against Him, Police Department Says,
CNN (May 29, 2020, 5:39 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/28/us/minneapolis-officercomplaints-george-floyd/index.html [https://perma.cc/B5Z5-H23K].
12. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006).
13. See Maya Lau, Police PR Machine Under Scrutiny for Inaccurate Reporting, Alleged ProCop Bias, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-0830/police-public-relations [https://perma.cc/N4R9-SFH4] (using case study of Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Office to examine the growth of “crisis communications” operations within law enforcemen t
agencies, which have at times disseminated incomplete or misleading information in an attempt to
rationalize questionable use-of-force decisions: “Public information officers have taken on an
expanded role within police departments in recent years, with the ability to publish news on their own
platforms, including social media, instead of relying on traditional media.”).
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restricting communications between police and the news media. The
article concludes that there is no doctrinal support in constitutional law
for gagging police officers from supplying information to journalists, and
further, that such speech-restrictive policies are civically unhealthy as a
matter of public policy. Section II lays out the First Amendment principles
that govern speech in the public workplace and how federal courts have
narrowed traditionally commodious free-speech protections in deference
to countervailing managerial interests. Section III describes how news
organizations have struggled to obtain complete and candid information
about the activities of police agencies in the absence of unfettered access
to the officers with subject-matter knowledge and why access to that
information is of great public value. Section IV describes how courts have
overwhelmingly issued speech-protective rulings when police and
firefighters have challenged blanket prohibitions on unauthorized
communications with the press and public. Section V then turns to an
analysis of policies gathered by researchers at the Brechner Center for
Freedom of Information from law enforcement agencies throughout the
United States, analyzing the policies’ constitutionality against the
prevailing standards established in a half-century’s worth of successful
First Amendment challenges. Section VI analyzes the rationales
commonly offered to justify restraining law enforcement officers’ speech
and concludes that more narrowly tailored proscriptions can amply
accommodate legitimate confidentiality concerns. Finally, Section VII
concludes that the widespread practice of restricting police from offering
their candid perspective to the public disserves the interests of the officers
(as a matter of workplace safety), the public (as a matter of police
accountability), and the law enforcement agencies themselves (as a matter
of rebuilding the trust sundered by a wave of nationally publicized
instances of excessive use of deadly force). 14

14. See N’dea Yancey-Bragg, Americans’ Confidence in Police Falls to Historic Low, Gallup
Poll Shows, USA TODAY (Aug. 12, 2020, 12:12 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/nation/2020/08/12/americans-confidence-police-falls-new-low-gallup-pollshows/3352910001/ [https://perma.cc/H5GL-2S9M] (reporting on nationwide survey, taken in the
wake of the May 2020 police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis, which showed that only 48%
of Americans have “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of trust in police, with distrust especially pronounced
among Black respondents).
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FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE GOVERNMENT WORKPLACE

A. Government Gatekeeping: Regulator Versus Supervisor
The First Amendment is understood to strictly circumscribe the
government’s authority to prohibit or punish speech, with only narrow
exceptions for especially harmful speech, such as “true threats” of
violence. 15 In particular, the courts have forcefully protected speech that
addresses matters of public concern (e.g., social and political issues),
recognizing that the public and the democratic process benefit from the
free flow of ideas. 16 Government policies that discriminate based on the
content of speech are especially disfavored and subject to strict scrutiny if
challenged. 17 To cite one example, the Supreme Court found that a
Chicago ordinance against picketing in residential areas was
impermissibly content-based because it singled out only certain types of
messages as punishable—those unrelated to labor disputes. 18 A rule or
policy that discriminates based on the speaker’s viewpoint is an especially
disfavored type of content-based discrimination, and courts view such
restrictions with singular skepticism. 19
Prior restraints that prevent a speaker’s message from ever reaching
its intended audience are especially disfavored and are rarely found
constitutional when challenged. 20 When a government agency acts as a
gatekeeper, insisting that speakers must obtain permission before
15. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (enumerating narrow list of
categories historically recognized as unprotected by the First Amendment and thus subject to contentbased regulation, including “true threats,” child pornography, fraud, and similar types of harmcausing speech).
16. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (“[S]peech concerning public affairs
is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (assessing libel case against newspaper brought by public officials in light
of “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”).
17. Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. R EV. 231, 237 (2012).
18. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980).
19. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“When
the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the
violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant. . . . Viewpoint discrimination is thus an
egregious form of content discrimination.”) (citation omitted).
20. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (“Any system of prior restraints
of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.”);
see also Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny
in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. R EV. 793, 844 (2006) (analyzing federal courts’ application of
“strict scrutiny” doctrine and concluding that “strict scrutiny is actually most fatal in the area of free
speech, where the survival rate is 22%, lower than in any other right”).
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speaking, any such “licensing” regime will be deemed unconstitutional
unless there are rigorous safeguards in place, including neutral and
objective criteria to prevent the government from making viewpointdiscriminatory decisions. 21 For instance, the Supreme Court struck down
a Georgia county ordinance requiring a permit for demonstrations on
public property because it gave the county administrator unreviewable
discretion to decide how much to charge each applicant, inviting
viewpoint-discriminatory variances. 22
Courts regularly invalidate restrictions on speech on the grounds of
vagueness or overbreadth. Vague statutes offend the Constitution because
they fail to give the speaker fair warning of what speech will trigger
punitive sanctions. 23 Speakers subject to vague restraints are likely to
censor themselves to make sure they are stopping well short of the line of
punishability. 24 An overbroad restriction prohibits substantially more
speech than necessary to achieve the government’s stated objective,
sweeping in harmless or even societally beneficial speech. 25
First Amendment rights apply in the government workplace, but the
degree of protection has long been disputed. Courts widely recognize that
government agencies have greater authority to regulate their employees’
speech than the speech of the general public because agencies speak
through their employees as agents and because speech can sometimes
undermine workplace harmony or shake public confidence in the
agency. 26

21. Now-Justice Elena Kagan explained the doctrine elaborately in a 1996 law journal article:
“A law conferring standardless discretion effectively delegates to administrators the power to make
decisions about speech on the basis of content. Such administrative decisions raise the same
constitutional concern as do content-based laws: the danger of improper motive.” Elena Kagan,
Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63
U. C HI . L. R EV. 413, 457 (1996).
22. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992).
23. See Commonwealth v. Ashcraft, 691 S.W.2d 229, 230 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985) (“It has been
held that an enactment may be void for vagueness where it fails to give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.”).
24. See Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 283 (1961) (“The vices inherent in an
unconstitutionally vague statute—the risk of unfair prosecution and the potential deterrence of
constitutionally protected conduct—have been repeatedly pointed out in our decisions.”).
25. See M. Chester Nolte, Invalid for Vagueness or Overbreadth: Challenging Prohibition of
Protected Speech, 30 EDUC. L. R EP. 1017, 1020 (1986) (“[A] statute is said to be overbroad when its
language, given its ordinary meaning, is so broad that the sanctions apply to conduct that the state is
not entitled to regulate.”).
26. See Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The First
Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX. L. R EV. 1, 4 (1990) (“[W]hile first-amendment doctrine
has developed so as to expand expressive liberty against the state acting as sovereign, Supreme Court
opinions over the past decade suggest that courts are to defer to rather than scrutinize the judgments
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Until the mid-20th century, it was widely accepted that public
employment was a “privilege” that could freely be taken away without
running afoul of the First Amendment, even if the employer’s motive was
to punish speech. 27 That began to change in response to the McCarthy
“Communist witch hunt” era as courts rejected the notion that public
employees could be compelled to divulge their past political associations
or renounce their political beliefs. 28
B. NTEU: Prior Restraints Don’t Work at Work
Once the federal courts recognized that the First Amendment applies
in the public sector workplace, a key question naturally arose: Does the
prior restraint doctrine curb the authority of government supervisors to
restrict employees from speaking? In 1995, the Supreme Court finally
answered the question with a resounding “yes.”
United States v. National Treasury Employees Union (popularly
known as the “NTEU” case) involved a ban on speaking fees for Congress
members and executive branch employees, imposed for the rationale of
curbing influence-buying. 29 The Supreme Court found the statute overly
broad because its deterrent effect was so powerful as to constitute a prior
restraint on a wide swath of speech by many thousands of employees,
warranting an exacting level of scrutiny. 30 Though the restriction was on
payment for speaking, not on the speech itself, the Court found this
distinction immaterial, as its purpose and effect was to inhibit government
employees from speaking at all. 31
The policy in question encompassed speech that was “addressed to a
public audience,” was “made outside the workplace,” and “involved
content largely unrelated to . . . [g]overnment employment.”32
Essentially, the government attempted to regulate speech far removed
of governmental decision makers when regulating expressive activity in institutional contexts such as
public employment, school, and the military.”).
27. See Cynthia Estlund, Free Speech Rights That Work at Work: From the First Amendmen t
to Due Process, 54 UCLA L. R EV. 1463, 1465 (2007) (“Public employees were once relegated to that
black hole of constitutional law known as the rights-privileges distinction.”).
28. See id. at 1466 (explaining that, beginning in the 1950s, federal courts developed a different
approach when weighing constitutional challenges to the loss of discretionary benefits: “The
government is not required to confer on individuals valuable entitlements such as welfare benefits,
professional licenses, or employment. But when it does so, it may not withhold or take away those
entitlements for unconstitutional reasons.”).
29. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454, 473 (1995).
30. Id. at 468.
31. Id. at 468–69.
32. Id. at 466.
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from the speaker’s position as a government employee. This necessitated
heightened scrutiny, as the prohibition on compensation for outside
speech or writing “unquestionably impose[d] a significant burden on
expressive activity” that would have been permissible but for the
speaker’s status as a government employee. 33
To justify a prior restraint on speech, the government must show that
the interests of both “potential audiences and a vast group of present and
future employees in a broad range of present and future expression are
outweighed” by the expression’s impact on the actual operation of the
government. 34 Where the government regulates expression to address an
anticipated harm, they must show that the harm is real and not merely
speculative and that the restriction will prevent the harm in a direct and
material way. 35 A prior restraint cannot be upheld absent a showing that
there is “a reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free
speech is practiced.” 36
NTEU set forth a demanding standard: The government must “show
that the speech being restricted necessarily would have impacted the
actual operation of the government” and that any restriction is narrowly
tailored to prevent that harm. 37 Otherwise, “[d]eferring to the
Government’s speculation about the pernicious effects of thousands of
articles and speeches yet to be written or delivered would encroach
unacceptably on the First Amendment’s protections.” 38 NTEU remains the
standard in any case involving pre-speech regulation, with courts rejecting
less-stringent tests to ensure that prior restraints on employee speech are
as limited in scope as possible. 39
The justices in NTEU took pains to distinguish the context of a
blanket prior restraint on speech that affects an entire class of employees
from the more-familiar First Amendment scenario of a challenge to an
individualized disciplinary action for speech that the employer deems

33. Id. at 468.
34. Id. (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571 (1968)).
35. Id. at 475.
36. Id. at 475 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)).
37. See Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters Loc. 3233 v. Frenchtown Charter Twp., 246 F. Supp. 2d 734,
740 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (referencing the NTEU standards).
38. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 476–77 n.21.
39. Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters Loc. 3233, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 740 (maintaining that if a regulation
contains a pre-speech threat of punishment, the NTEU test is the only one that is proper).
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disruptive. 40 In that latter scenario, federal courts apply a more deferential
measure of review that has its roots in Pickering and its progeny. 41
Pickering held that public employees do not surrender all of their
free-speech rights and that they cannot be penalized for speaking in an
unofficial capacity about matters of public concern. 42 When an employee
challenges punishment for the content of speech, Pickering sets up a twopronged test: First, the court assesses whether the employee was speaking
as a citizen on a matter of public concern. 43 Matters of public concern
have come to be defined by the courts as those including political or social
issues, matters of public health and safety, and matters relating to officers’
own working conditions and compensation. 44
Second, the court must inquire whether the speech jeopardized
workplace functions severely enough to override the employee’s
presumptive right to speak freely, such as by provoking disharmony
among coworkers that interferes with the agency’s ability to do business,
or undermining the public’s trust in the agency. 45 To justify imposing
discipline for the content of employee speech, the speech must “impair
discipline by superiors, have a detrimental impact on close working
relationships, undermine a legitimate goal or mission of the employer,
impede the performance of the speaker’s duties, or impair harmony
among coworkers.” 46 The two prongs of the Pickering test are commonly
understood as a balancing test between the employee’s interest in
addressing the contemporary issues of the day and the employer’s interest
in managing the agency and maintaining relations with the public. 47
In the decades since Pickering, the Court has put a somewhat more
employer-friendly gloss on the balancing test, finding that speech is
unprotected if it constitutes a purely personal grievance over one’s

40. See NTEU, 513 U.S. at 468 (holding that “the Government’s burden is greater with respect
to this statutory restriction on expression than with respect to an isolated disciplinary action”).
41. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
42. Id. at 574.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that
speech criticizing compensation for officers “substantially involved matters of public concern and
was thus entitled to the highest level of protection”); Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters Loc. 3233, 246 F.
Supp. 2d at 737 (labor disputes and alleged violations of workplace safety laws are matters of public
concern); Kessler v. City of Providence, 167 F. Supp. 2d 482, 486 (D.R.I. 2001) (“police department
policies, procedures, and rules” are matters of public concern because of their potential effect on
public safety).
45. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
46. Meyers v. City of Cincinnati, 934 F.2d 726, 730 (6th Cir. 1991).
47. Id.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol55/iss1/1

10

LoMonte and Terkovich: Your Have the Duty to Remain Silent

2022]

YOU HAVE THE DUTY TO R EMAIN S ILENT

11

workplace dissatisfaction 48 or if the speech itself is part of a work
assignment, such as writing a memo. 49 But in its most recent employeespeech case, Lane v. Franks, the Court clarified that speech does not lose
First Amendment protection merely because it involves the topic of the
workplace or draws on information learned at work. 50 Thus, public
employees have meaningful protection against punishment by their
employers even when discussing work-related matters—especially if the
punishment is for disobeying a prior restraint designed to prevent speech
from ever being heard.
III.

THE IMPORTANCE

OF ACCESS

The problem of government image-minders impeding journalists’
access to rank-and-file public employees is well-documented and not
limited to the law enforcement setting. During the Obama administration,
news organizations chafed at tight restrictions on access to federal
policymakers and experts within the executive branch. 51 A coalition of
journalism advocates led by the Society of Professional Journalists
(“SPJ”) wrote letters of concern to both the Obama and Trump
administrations about the silencing of federal employees but received no
redress. 52
It is especially concerning when law enforcement officers are gagged
from freely speaking because policing is a uniquely important
governmental function. Criminal justice agencies are alone among
government authorities in their power to take away people’s freedom and
even use deadly force. How those agencies use their authority is
manifestly a matter of paramount public concern, 53 and in the absence of
effective public scrutiny and oversight, abuses can proliferate. 54

48. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983).
49. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
50. Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 240 (2014).
51. See Roger Yu, Report: Obama Often Blocks Press Access to Information, USA TODAY
(Oct. 10, 2013 4:46 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2013/10/10/cpj-report-on-obamapress/2960607/ [https://perma.cc/25KD-H2MW] (describing findings of Committee to Protect
Journalists report decrying barriers to media access during the Obama administration).
52. Al Tompkins, SPJ Research Suggests that a Surge in PIOs Negatively Impacts Journalism,
P OYNTER (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.poynter.org/newsletters/2018/spj-research-suggests-that-asurge-in-pios-negatively-impacts-journalism/ [https://perma.cc/9WQK-M6DX].
53. See Auriemma v. Rice, 910 F.2d 1449, 1460 (7th Cir. 1990) (“It would be difficult to find
a matter of greater public concern in a large metropolitan area than police protection and public
safety.”).
54. See Peer News LLC v. City of Honolulu, 376 P.3d 1, 22 (Haw. 2016) (“Police officers are
entrusted with the right to use force—even deadly force in some circumstances—and this right can
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The ability to speak with law enforcement officers helps journalists
tell compelling stories. For instance, after an angry mob stormed the U.S.
Capitol building on Jan. 6, 2021, in an attempt to prevent Congress from
certifying Joe Biden as the winner of the 2020 presidential election,
Capitol police officers gave riveting accounts of being brutally beaten by
rioters. 55 The authenticity of officers’ firsthand accounts—authenticity
that would have been lacking in a mere prepared statement issued by a
spokesperson—made it more difficult for apologists to insist that the
insurrection was nonviolent. When emboldened to speak publicly, officers
have told stories that were by turns inspiring and enraging. Law
enforcement officers shared their insider perspective to alert the public to
understaffing, equipment shortages, and other management issues within
their departments that bear on public safety 56 —the type of criticism that
they almost certainly would not get approval to voice if required to vet
their interviews in advance through a public relations functionary.
If the officers who have firsthand knowledge of newsworthy
situations are prohibited from speaking, journalists may be forced to
accept information under a grant of anonymity. 57 For instance, when the
be subject to abuse. Public oversight minimizes the possibility of abuse by ensuring that police
departments and officers are held accountable for their actions.”).
55. See Tim Elfrink, D.C. Officer Who Suffered Heart Attack on Jan. 6 Calls Out Trump for
Downplaying ‘Brutal, Savage’ Riot, WASH. P OST (Apr. 28, 2021. 3:32 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/04/28/michael-fanone-trump-gop-riots/
[https://perma.cc/4T69-KAB2]; Jackie Bensen, ‘It Was Brutal, Medieval-Style Combat’: DC Police
Officers Describe Defending US Capitol, NBC WASH. (Jan. 16, 2021, 11:48 AM),
https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/it-was-brutal-medieval-style-combat-dc-policeofficers-describe-defending-us-capitol/2542536/ [https://perma.cc/K23K-7JWG].
56. See, e.g., LaShanda McCuin, More Resources Needed to Address the Mental Health of
Officers, Police Say, KNOE NEWS (May 13, 2021, 7:17 PM), https://www.knoe.com/
2021/05/13/more-resources-needed-to-address-m ental-health-of-o fficers-police-say/
[https://perma.cc/YBU4-7CE6] (quoting Louisiana police sergeant decrying insufficiency of mental
health services for law enforcement officers); Rebecca Lopez, Richardson Police Department Patrol
Division Under Review After Some Officers Say They’re Being Forced into Ticket-Writing
Competition, WFAA (May 6, 2021. 11:24 PM), https://www.wfaa.com/article/news/local/somerichardson-police-officers-say-ticket-writing-competition/287-c35e885 a-d150-4b3 f-a6052c2bdb261391 [https://perma.cc/84V6-MHLA] (quoting members of Texas police force who say
their department is violating state law by holding officers to a ticket-writing quota under threat of
discipline); Kerri O’Brien,’They’re Not Cleaning Properly’: Deerfield Corrections Officers Speak
Out Against Conditions, WRIC (Sept. 26, 2020, 9:05 AM), https://www.wric.com/news/virginianews/theyre-not-cleaning-properly-deerfield-corrections-offi cers -speak -out-against-conditions/
[https://perma.cc/RW5Q-B7LQ] (describing accounts from six Virginia correctional officers who
accused the state prison system of scrimping on COVID-19 safety measures, allowing the deadly
virus to proliferate inside correctional institutions).
57. See, e.g., Mariah Medina, Dillon Collier, & Joshua Saunders, ‘This Is the Worst It’s Ever
Been’: Frustration Grows Among Bexar County Jail Deputies, KSAT (Aug. 16, 2019, 3:58 PM),
https://www.ksat.com/news/2019/08/16/this-is-the-worst-its-ever-been-frustration-grows-among-
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Reuters news agency published a nationwide look at inadequacies in
safety protocols to protect police officers during the COVID-19
pandemic, they were unable to share personal accounts from officers in
New York City, the epicenter of the outbreak: “All of the New York
officers interviewed by Reuters spoke on condition of anonymity. They
say the department forbids them from speaking to reporters.” 58 Coverage
of police news regularly relies on “sources” within law enforcement
agencies, even in situations of high public interest that law enforcement
agencies should feel duty-bound to comment on, including responding to
allegations of misconduct by officers. 59 But attributing information to
unnamed police sources is an imperfect recourse. Anonymously sourced
bexar-county-jail-deputies/ [https://perma.cc/GZ9F-ABKV] (quoting Texas county sheriff’s officer
“who spoke on condition that they would not be identified because they are not authorized to speak
with the media,” complaining about low morale because of dangerously long shifts, high turnover and
other problems).
58. Michelle Conlin, Linda So, Brad Heath, & Grant Smith, Coronavirus Hits Hundreds of U.S.
Police Amid Protective Gear Shortages, R EUTERS (Mar. 30, 2020, 1:22 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usa-police-insight/coronavirus-hitshundreds-of-u-s-police-amid-protective-gear-short ages-idUSKBN21H2X6 [https://perma.cc/B2K99P23]. The same proved true in Chicago as well. See Patrick Smith, The Chicago Police Department
Is Struggling to Protect Officers During the Coronavirus Pandemic, WBEZ C HI . (Mar. 23, 2020, 2:49
PM), https://www.wbez.org/stories/chicago-police-department-struggles-to-protect-officers-duri n g coronavirus-crisis/df5e9795-f38a-4d07-9093-b2b791b72f1d [https://perma.cc/GX92-PS2R] (“On e
veteran Chicago police officer, who asked not to be named because he wasn’t authorized to speak to
the media, said he was worried about not having enough hand sanitizer. He also said he was concerned
about squad cars and other shared equipment not being cleaned between shifts.”).
59. See, e.g., Kevin Foster, Quawan Charles’ Disappearance Didn’t Meet Amber Alert
Criteria, Source Says; Drowning Possible Factor in Death, KPLCTV (Nov. 16, 2020, 5:36 PM),
https://www.kplctv.com/2020/11/16/quawan-charles-disappearance-didnt-meet-amber-alert-criteriasource-says-drowning-possible-factor-death/ [https://perma.cc/2D2F-ZA23] (relying on unnamed
police source to address controversy over Louisiana police department’s decision not to issue missingpersons alert for teenager who was later found dead); Samah Assad, Christopher Hacker & Brad
Edwards, Names, Private Information of Child Sex Crime Victims Were Illegally Made Public in Cook
County Court Records, CBS C HI . (Oct. 23, 2020, 9:07 AM), https://chicago.cbslocal.com/
2020/10/23/names-private-information-of-child-sex-crime-victims-were-illegally-made-public-incook-county-court-records/ [https://perma.cc/8NCM-XDZW] (quoting “high-ranking Chicago Police
Department source” reacting to police department’s failure to redact names of juvenile sex crime
victims from documents filed in court, exposing their identities in violation of state law); Daniel
Telvock, Buffalo Police Internal Affairs Investigative Officer Involved in Off-Duty Elmwood Fight,
WIVB (Sept. 4, 2020, 1:37 PM), https://www.wivb.com/news/buffalo-police-internal-affairsinvestigative-officer-involved-in-off-duty-elmwood-fight/ [https://perma.cc/246F-JUKV] (relying on
unnamed police source to explain circumstances of street fight in which off-duty New York police
officer was videotaped punching a man and squatting on top of him); Pam McLoughlin, West Haven
Police Sergeant Used Facebook Aliases, Deleted Posts, Report Alleges, NEW HAVEN R EG. (Jan. 18,
2019 10:22 AM), https://www.nhregister.com/news/article/Report-details-West-Haven-pol i cesergeant-s-13542467.php [perma.cc/4LNF-AW9B] (relying on “a police department source” to
address the agency’s response to an independent investigation concluding that a senior member of the
police force padded his time sheets to inflate his pay, and that the department needed to strengthen its
financial controls).
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stories are inherently less believable to the audience, 60 and stories heavily
based on information from unnamed sources are more easily denied.61 To
preserve anonymity, reporters often must omit identifying personal details
about the interviewee—the type of details that can humanize news
accounts and make them more relatable. The refuge of anonymity can be
abused, too, by sources with an agenda to release false or misleading
information without accountability. 62 Relying on unnamed sources can
even place journalists and their employers at greater risk of legal liability,
as some courts have found that publishing an article based wholly on
anonymous informants can support a finding of reckless disregard for the
truth if the information turns out to be erroneous. 63
Alternatively, journalists may turn to former officers—people who
have been fired or quit and have nothing left to lose—to blow the whistle
about abusive workplace conditions. For instance, a former small-town
police officer in Louisiana took his complaints about supervisory sexual
harassment to the Baton Rouge newspaper after filing discrimination
complaints that, he says, were not taken seriously; two other former
employees of the same department shared similar stories with the
newspaper but insisted on remaining unnamed because they remain
employed in law enforcement. 64 But that option, too, comes with
credibility costs. A former employee may understandably come across, to
a skeptical audience, as a score-settler nursing a grudge whose word is to
60. See Tom Jones, Here’s Why You Should Be Willing to Believe Anonymous Sources,
P OYNTER (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.poynter.org/newsletters/2020/heres-why-you-should-bewilling-to-believe-anonymous-sources/ [https://perma.cc/2CFT-CWM9] (“The problem with
anonymous sources is that the public might not trust that the source actually exists or that the source
is truly reliable.”).
61. See id. (citing example of Trump White House’s practice of claiming that anonymously
sourced news stories were fabricated and that reporters’ purported sources were fictitious: “[I]f no
one is publicly putting their name on the allegations, dismissing it is easier to do.”); see also Patrick
M. Garry, Anonymous Sources, Libel Law, and the First Amendment, 78 TEMP. L. R EV. 579, 595
(2005) (collecting critiques, including those within the journalism field, of the growing over-reliance
on unnamed sources, and commenting that “without the context of knowing the source’s identity,
readers and viewers cannot fully understand or analyze the meaning of facts disclosed by that
source”).
62. See David Abramowicz, Calculating the Public Interest in Protecting Journalists’
Confidential Sources, 108 C OLUM. L. R EV. 1949, 1950 (2008) (noting that leakers sometimes furnish
information opportunistically with an agenda to do harm, and commenting that “journalists’
confidentiality promises may be used not to protect the weak from retribution, but to protect the
powerful from accountability”).
63. See Garry, supra note 63, at 595.
64. Megan Wyatt, Broussard Police Chief Faces Allegations of Sexual Harassment by Former
Officers, ACADIANA ADVOCATE (Apr. 17, 2021, 4:00 AM), https://www.theadvocate.com/acadiana/
news/crime_police/article_84843276
-9b9d-11eb-a0ae-03aa7e4d5851.html [https://perma.cc/L34L-3L69].
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be taken lightly. There is, in short, no substitute for unfettered, on-therecord access to the people within an agency who have expert knowledge
to share.
While agencies may rationalize compulsory screening of media
interviews as a convenience that facilitates access, a series of studies by
the SPJ has found the opposite: Public information spokespeople make it
more difficult for journalists to access officers for interviews, with 60%
of crime reporters stating their access has been limited and 26.1%
reporting that their access has been barred altogether. 65 A 2016 study by
Kennesaw State University journalism professor Carolyn Carlson, a
former SPJ national president, found that 31.5% of journalists were rarely
or never allowed to interview their town’s chief of police, 66 55% are rarely
to never allowed to interview officers on-scene, 67 and 41.6% of journalists
report access to police departments overall has become more difficult in
the previous five to ten years. 68
Veteran police reporter and true-crime author David Krajicek has
written about the increasing difficulty that journalists encounter when
running up against hidebound law enforcement agencies:
The 20-year trend in police reporting has been toward limiting access to
“real” cops in favor of a public information officer (PIO) who serves as
an information filter. At crime scenes, we are bullpenned behind ropes
and subjected to “briefings.” Any enterprise reporting that goes beyond
the briefing is likely to be viewed unfavorably . . . . 69

There is no question, then, that law enforcement agencies’ restrictive
policies are having their intended effect of dampening media coverage.
The question is: Are these policies legal?

65. Id.
66. Carolyn Carlson & Paymon Kashani, Mediated Access: Crime Reporters’ Perceptions of
Public Information Officers’ Media Control Efforts, Use of Social Media, Handling of Body Camera
Footage and Public Records, S OC’Y OF P RO. JOURNALISTS 2 (Mar. 2016), https://www.spj.org/
pdf/sunshineweek/crime-reporters-survey-report.pdf.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. David J. Krajicek, Nobody Loves a Crime Reporter, 2003 J. INST. JUST. & INT’L S TUD. 33,
34 (2003).
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WHAT COURTS HAVE SAID: UNTIE THE GAGS

A. Uniformed not Uninformed: Courts Value Officers’
Contributions to Public Discourse
Police officers and firefighters have periodically clashed with their
superiors over restrictive policies that forbid unapproved interaction with
the news media. While public safety agencies are not, by far, the only
agencies that restrict employee communications with the media, it makes
sense that those agencies would be regular sources of legal disputes:
Police and firefighters are often involved in newsworthy events, and their
agencies tend to be unionized, meaning they have professional advocates
to fight their legal battles. 70
Since 1968, when the Supreme Court recognized in Pickering that
government employees have a constitutional right to speak about matters
of public concern, police and firefighters have overwhelmingly prevailed
when challenging the constitutionality of prohibitions against unapproved
communications with the press and public. Indeed, once a regulation is
understood to categorically forbid discussing work-related issues with the
media—or to require advance approval before doing so—the policy is
invariably found to be unconstitutional. 71
Judicial disfavor for rules that forbid public employees from
speaking to the news media predates Pickering. In 1946, New York’s
highest court found that the New York City fire department violated
firefighters’ First Amendment rights by directing union leaders not to talk
to the media, relying on a department policy stating that firefighters “shall
not sanction the use of their names or photographs, in connection with any
written or printed article . . . without the written approval of the Chief of
Department.” 72 The court found that the city fire commissioner’s directive
against speaking to the press “was so broad in scope and so rigid in terms
as to be arbitrary and unreasonable.”73 But the frequency of legal disputes
over gag policies escalated after the 1968 Pickering ruling explicitly

70. See ECONOMIC NEWS R ELEASE, U.S. B UREAU OF LAB. S TATS., UNION MEMBERS
S UMMARY, USDL-21-0081 (Jan. 22, 2021), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm
[https://perma.cc/4P9N-G6D6] (reporting that 36.6% of workers in “protective service occupations ”
are unionized, the highest percentage of any sector).
71. Frank D. LoMonte, Putting the ‘Public’ Back into Public Employment: A Roadmap for
Challenging Prior Restraints That Prohibit Government Employees from Speaking to the News
Media, 68 U. KAN. L. R EV. 1, 14–18 (2019).
72. Kane v. Walsh, 66 N.E.2d 53, 55 (N.Y. 1946).
73. Id. at 56.
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recognized that public employees do not surrender their free speech rights
when they accept a government paycheck.
In a 1971 ruling that represents the earliest known post-Pickering
case, a Louisiana federal court threw out disciplinary sanctions against a
police officer who wrote an article for his union newsletter critical of the
police department, finding that the rules under which he was disciplined
were unconstitutionally broad. 74 Among the rules that the court deemed
invalid was a confidentiality policy that forbade sharing “the content of
any official instruction, policy, or record, or the conduct of departmental
functions” and another policy against allowing the publication of any
“statement concerning official business or law enforcement policy”
without supervisory approval. 75
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have found in favor of law enforcement
officers challenging policies that entirely forbade speaking to the press
and public, or that curtailed the topics that officers are permitted to
discuss. 76 In Barrett v. Thomas, the Fifth Circuit struck down a Texas
sheriff’s department policy that prevented employees from making
“unauthorized public statements” and forbade comments to reporters on
any topic “that is or could be of a controversial nature.” 77 The lead
plaintiff was a sheriff’s officer who, after publicly criticizing the newly
elected sheriff for demoting him, was then fired in response to the
criticism. 78 The appellate panel held that, although a law enforcement
supervisor has a legitimate interest in promoting discipline and efficiency,
“the public employer may not employ a prophylactic approach that
prohibits constitutionally protected expression.” 79 The two regulations,
the court concluded, were facially unconstitutional both because of their
overbreadth and because they were unduly vague. 80
A more recent First Amendment challenge reached a comparable
outcome in Moonin v. Tice, in which the Ninth Circuit struck down a
speech-restrictive policy that prevented employees of the Nevada
Highway Patrol from speaking to the press or public about the patrol’s K9 program, which had been a matter of controversy. 81 The challenged
regulation instructed patrol officers that “[a]ny communication with ANY
74.
75.
76.
1981).
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Flynn v. Giarrusso, 321 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. La. 1971).
Id. at 1300–01.
Moonin v. Tice, 868 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2017); Barrett v. Thomas, 649 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir.
Barrett, 649 F.2d at 1199.
Id. at 1196.
Id. at 1199.
Id. at 1198.
Moonin, 868 F.3d at 862.
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non-departmental and non-law enforcement entity or persons regarding
the Nevada Highway Patrol K9 program . . . WILL be expressly
forwarded for approval to your chain-of-command.” 82 The appellate court
found that the policy was infirm because it could easily be interpreted as
limiting all officer speech, not just speech made in an official capacity. 83
The Moonin court noted that the policy in question was so broad that it
“reaches legitimate ‘whistleblower’ complaints about the program.”84 The
policy was so broadly worded, the judges wrote, that it could be read to
apply even when speaking with family and friends, speech that is clearly
not made in any official capacity. 85
In addition to the circuit-level interpretations, more than a dozen trial
courts have similarly ruled in favor of public safety officers in facially
challenging broad restrictions on speech to the press and public. 86 This
body of precedent strongly indicates that a policy forbidding all
unapproved contact with the news media, however commonplace, will not
survive if challenged as an affront to the First Amendment.
B. Fatally Flawed: Gag Policies Flunk Test of Vagueness,
Overbreadth, Unbridled Discretion
Most commonly, employer gag rules flunk First Amendment
scrutiny because they are overbroad, failing to distinguish between speech
under official duties that the employer can legitimately regulate and
speech in a constitutionally protected personal capacity. 87 For instance, an
Illinois federal court found that the Chicago Fire Department’s policy
requiring pre-approval for “interviews, television, radio or movie
appearances, whether on or off duty, relating to Fire Department
82. Id. at 859 (emphasis in original).
83. Id. at 862.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 863.
86. Brady v. Tamburini, 518 F. Supp. 3d 570 (D.R.I. 2021); Davis v. Phenix City, No.
3:06cv544-WHA, 2008 WL 401349 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 12, 2008); Lauretano v. Spada, 339 F. Supp. 2d
391 (D. Conn. 2004); Parow v. Kinnon, 300 F. Supp. 2d 256 (D. Mass. 2004); Int’l Ass’n of
Firefighters Loc. 3233 v. Frenchtown Charter Twp., 246 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Kessler
v. City of Providence 167 F. Supp. 2d 482 (D.R.I. 2001); Wagner v. City of Holyoke, 100 F. Supp.
2d 78 (D. Mass. 2000); Davis v. N.J. Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety, 742 A.2d 619 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1999); Providence Firefighters Local 799 v. City of Providence, 26 F. Supp. 2d 350 (D.R.I.
1998); Spain v. City of Mansfield, 915 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Ohio 1996); Grady v. Blair, 529 F. Supp.
370 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Steenrod v. Board of Engineers, 386 N.Y.S.2d 788 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Flynn v.
Giarrusso, 321 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. La. 1971).
87. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006) (holding that “the First Amendment does
not prohibit managerial discipline based on an employee’s expressions made pursuant to official
responsibilities”).
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activities” was overly broad. 88 The court characterized the policy as “an
unconstitutional prior restraint and . . . a ‘gag rule’ that prevents the
dissemination of not only incorrect information, but correct information
and matters of opinion as well.” 89 Similarly, a federal court in Rhode
Island struck down a directive requiring “express authorization” before
any member of the Providence Police Department could speak to the news
media and forbidding officers from making “any public statement
regarding a private matter of [the] department” or sharing “any
information concerning the business of the department.” 90 The court
emphasized that the policy affected not only the employee’s interest in
being heard, but also the public’s interest in receiving information about
policing: “Such an all-encompassing ban necessarily works to deprive
Police Department employees of their First Amendment right, as citizens,
to comment on matters of public interest, thereby depriving the public of
information regarding matters relevant to public health and safety.”91
Similarly, a New York state-court judge recognized the public value of
fire safety information in ruling that a municipal fire department policy
requiring supervisory approval for firefighters to discuss “matters
concerning the department” was unduly broad. 92 The court enjoined the
disciplinary proceeding against a union official who gave an unapproved
speech questioning the effectiveness of the city’s fire-safety policies:
“Since it is undisputed that fire protection for any municipality is a matter
of grave public interest, the regulations in question appear to absolutely
restrict petitioner’s right of free speech.” 93
A policy can be unconstitutionally broad even when it restricts only
a subcategory of speech if that subcategory encompasses some
constitutionally protected expression, as with the Ninth Circuit’s Moonin
case. For instance, in Wagner v. City of Holyoke, a whistleblower who
was punished for telling the news media that a fellow officer had
physically and verbally abused an arrestee challenged the constitutionality
88. Grady, 529 F. Supp. at 371 n.1.
89. Id. at 372.
90. Kessler, 167 F. Supp. 2d at 483.
91. See id. at 487 (“The Rules are not narrowly drawn; they require prior approval before an
employee makes a public statement on any topic even remotely related to Police Department matters.
As a result, the Rules inevitably stifle Police Department employees in their role as citizens.”).
92. Steenrod v. Board of Engineers, 386 N.Y.S.2d 788, 789 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
93. Id. at 979; see also Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters Loc. 3233 v. Frenchtown Charter Twp., 246
F. Supp. 2d 734, 736 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (applying NTEU and concluding that fire department violated
employees’ First Amendment rights by enforcing a regulation providing that the fire chief “shall be
the only authorized person who may release facts regarding fire department matters, fires or other
emergencies to the news media”). The regulation in the Frenchtown Charter case was uniquely
extreme; it made unauthorized speech a misdemeanor criminal offense, not just a personnel matter.
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of his department’s speech restrictions. 94 A federal district court granted
an injunction against enforcing the department’s unconstitutionally broad
rules, which forbade criticizing other officers and allowed only the police
chief or a designee to release information “regarding policy, discipline,
organizational changes, and criticisms.” 95 Even though the rules only
selectively prohibited addressing certain subjects, rather than
categorically restraining all speech, the court found that the rules would
unduly inhibit speech addressing matters of public concern. 96
Courts have also found restrictive media policies unconstitutional
when they entrust the decisionmaker with unfettered discretion to decide
who may speak. For instance, in Lauretano v. Spada, a federal district
court grappled with a Connecticut State Police policy that forbade officers
from making “official comments relative to department policy” without
supervisory approval. 97 The court found the policy unconstitutional
because of its overbreadth and lack of intelligible standards, which gave
supervisors total discretion to dictate the timing of speech, potentially
allowing them to delay approval to the point that the request became
moot. 98 Similarly, the lack of any boundaries to cabin a decisionmaker’s
discretion doomed an Ohio fire department’s regulation forbidding any
unapproved public discussion of “matters concerning Mansfield Fire
Department rules, duties, policies, procedures and practices.” 99 A U.S.
district judge found the rule facially unconstitutional because “[t]here are
no standards which govern the approval or disapproval of the City
officials.” 100
In scrutinizing First Amendment challenges to gag rules, courts have
recognized the importance of timely information about matters of public
safety and the impact of gagging officers on the public’s receipt of
information as well as the officers’ rights. Not allowing officers to speak
in the wake of a critical incident can delay the immediacy of their speech
and decrease its newsworthiness. 101 Davis v. New Jersey Department of
Law & Public Safety involved such a restriction, forbidding any officer
from disclosing “any information not generally available to members of
the public” without supervisory approval and requiring officers to treat

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Wagner v. City of Holyoke, 100 F. Supp. 2d 78, 81 (D. Mass. 2000).
Id. at 89–90.
Id. at 90.
Lauretano v. Spada, 339 F. Supp. 2d 391, 414–15 (D. Conn. 2004).
Id. at 420 (quoting Harman v. City of New York, 140 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1998)).
Spain v. City of Mansfield, 915 F. Supp. 919, 922 (N.D. Ohio 1996).
Id. at 923.
Davis v. N.J. Dep’t of Law & Pub. Safety, 742 A.2d 619 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1999).
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“any information” pertaining to the agency as confidential. 102 The Davis
court recognized the unique value of information about policing, noting
that when officers are forced to navigate the obstacle of prior approval,
the public’s receipt of news is delayed and the value of any information
officers might offer is diluted. 103
Public employees have enjoyed the same overwhelming success
challenging broad gag regulations outside the context of public safety
agencies. 104 Most recently, a federal court in West Virginia ruled in favor
of a teacher who challenged a directive forbidding her from speaking to
the news media, which prevented her from defending herself against
criticism of divisive political remarks she shared on Twitter. 105 The court
held that the First Amendment prohibition against prior restraints was so
clearly established that the employer could not invoke the defense of
qualified immunity to defeat the teacher’s First Amendment claims. 106
The West Virginia court’s 2019 ruling aligns with decades’ worth of
authority, including circuit-level precedent from the Second and Tenth
Circuits, disapproving of categorical rules that forbid public employees
from speaking to the press and public, even outside the law enforcement
setting. 107
In addition to this direct body of precedent, several other circuits
have handed down rulings in favor of officers disciplined for violating
rules that prohibit public criticism of their agencies or their supervisors,
as opposed to categorically forbidding all work-related speech. While
these scenarios are analyzed as viewpoint discrimination cases rather than

102. Id. at 66.
103. Id.
104. See LoMonte, supra note 73, at 14 (collecting rulings in favor of employees facially
challenging workplace gag policies, and observing that “no ‘prior restraint’ on public employee
speech, even outside the context of media interviews, appears to survive constitutional challenge once
the strong medicine of NTEU is found to apply”).
105. Durstein v. Alexander, No. 3:19-0029, 2019 WL 6833858 (S.D.W. Va. Dec. 13, 2019).
106. Id. at *5.
107. See Harman v. City of New York, 140 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that a New
York social-service agency overreached in requiring employees to contact the agency’s publicrelations office before releasing any information to the media “regarding any policies or activities of
the Agency”); Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 602 F.3d 1175, 1185–87 (10th Cir.
2010) (finding that a school administrator violated clearly established First Amendment principles in
telling school employee not to discuss “school matters” with anyone outside the agency, a prohibition
beyond just safeguarding confidential student information); see also Luethje v. Peavine Sch. Dist.,
872 F.2d 352, 353 (10th Cir. 1989) (concluding that school board violated the First Amendment in
enacting and enforcing a rule restricting lunchroom employees’ speech, which read: “If you have any
problems, consult [the principal]. Don’t take any school problems other places, or discuss it with
others.”).
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as blanket prior restraints on all speech, the result is the same: Unduly
restrictive rules that inhibit whistleblowing are unconstitutional.
In a 1970 ruling, the Seventh Circuit struck down a Chicago Police
Department policy that, while not a classic gag rule, was applied to
discipline an officer who spoke critically about his agency to the news
media. 108 The plaintiff, a Chicago police detective who blew the whistle
on officers’ misuse of recovered stolen property, was reprimanded for
telling a news reporter that the internal affairs investigative process was
ineffective. 109 A disciplinary board found that the detective had violated a
workplace rule forbidding any speech or conduct “derogatory to the
Department or any member or policy of the Department.” 110 But the
Seventh Circuit found the regulation to be “unavoidably overbroad”
because it would inhibit any criticism of the police department, even
constitutionally protected speech. 111
Similarly, the Third Circuit ruled in favor of a New Jersey police
union leader who criticized police supervisors in a newspaper article and
was punished under a policy prohibiting any “derogatory reference to
Department orders or instructions” in public statements, or commenting
“unfavorably or disrespectfully on the official action of a superior officer”
or the department’s rules and procedures. 112 Even in this pre-NTEU case
applying a less rigorous Pickering review, the appeals court still found the
rules to be unconstitutionally broad, in recognition of “the public’s strong
interest in open debate and access to information about its police . . . .”113
Then, in a post-NTEU case, the Third Circuit applied the Supreme Court’s
more exacting review of prior restraints to strike down a Pittsburgh policy
requiring any police officer who wished to testify as an expert witness to
first obtain written permission from the chief. 114 As with the NTEU case,
even though the policy was not a categorical prohibition on all speech, the
court found that the proscription was unjustifiably broad and would
deprive the public of the benefit of officers’ expert perspective. 115
In recent years, the battle to control police employee speech has gone
where all speech has gone: online. 116 Restrictive speech policies have
108. Muller v. Conlisk, 429 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1970).
109. Id. at 902.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Gasparinetti v. Kerr, 568 F.2d 311, 315–16 (3d Cir. 1977).
113. Id. at 317.
114. Swartzwelder v. McNeilly, 297 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2002).
115. Id. at 231.
116. See Christina Jaremus, #FiredforFacebook: The Case for Greater Management Discretion
in Discipline or Discharge for Social Media Activity, 42 R UTGERS L. R EC. 1, 3 (2014–15) (“In the
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fared no better there. In Liverman v. City of St. Petersburg, the Fourth
Circuit ruled in favor of two officers disciplined for using personal
Facebook pages to express views critical of their agency’s promotion
standards. 117 The policy at issue in Liverman prohibited making any
“negative comments” about the department or other officers that would
impact the “public’s perception of the department” or “reflect
unfavorably” on the department. 118 Even an attempted savings clause,
which purported to allow officers to comment as citizens on matters of
public concern, did not salvage the otherwise unconstitutional policy in
the eyes of the court: “[T]he restraint is a virtual blanket prohibition on all
speech critical of the government employer.” 119
Notably, in none of the publicly reported First Amendment
challenges has a court treated the law enforcement context as conclusive.
While a law enforcement agency might argue that the sensitive nature of
police work justifies greater control over speech than in ordinary
government agencies, the courts have not made such a distinction. In the
Barrett case, the Fifth Circuit expressly differentiated policing from the
military, where greater control might be justified. 120
In sum, there is no support for the proposition that a government
employer may forbid employees from sharing their expertise with the
press and public, require supervisory approval as a precondition for
speaking, or selectively prohibit entire categories of speech on the basis
of viewpoint. And there is nothing unique about the setting of a publicsafety agency that changes this well-established rule.
V. PUTTING POLICE POLICIES UNDER SURVEILLANCE
Knowing that public employers may not forbid employees from
speaking to the media or enforce open-ended prohibitions on speaking that
lack safeguards against viewpoint discrimination, the question becomes
whether law enforcement agencies are obeying, or ignoring, these
constitutional imperatives. To answer this question, researchers from the
Brechner Center asked for media-relations policies from the nation’s fifty
context of employment, labor relations boards and courts have inevitably been called upon to
determine whether employers can discipline and/or fire employees for engaging in activity or speech
on social media.”).
117. Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400 (4th Cir. 2016).
118. Id. at 404.
119. Id. at 407.
120. See Barrett v. Thomas, 649 F.2d 1193, 1198 n.9 (5th Cir. 1981) (“The public employer’s
interest in regulating the speech of police officers does not rise to the level of the government’s interest
in regulating the conduct of military personnel.”).
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largest police departments and fifty largest county sheriff’s departments,
as tabulated by the U.S. Justice Department, representing one-hundred
total agencies in thirty-three states plus the District of Columbia.121 Of the
one-hundred law enforcement agencies that received a public records
request, seventy-seven departments responded, and twenty-three failed to
respond. 122 Three of the responding agencies indicated no written
regulation governing employee interaction with the news media. One
nonresponding agency’s news media policy, Memphis, was readily found
on the police department’s website and included in the study. So the
universe of policies examined for this study was seventy-five policies
from police and sheriff’s offices in twenty-seven states plus the District
of Columbia (twenty-eight total jurisdictions).
Most of the seventy-five policies include at least one feature that,
under prevailing legal precedent, renders them constitutionally suspect.
More than half of the policies—thirty-nine out of seventy-five policies, or
52%—explicitly contain prior restraints indistinguishable from those
repeatedly found unconstitutional because they require categorical
approval before speaking to the press or public. Another nineteen policies
(25% of those reviewed) contain constitutionally questionable contentspecific or context-specific restrictions—such as requiring prior approval
for addressing “controversial” matters or for “interviews,” but not for
routine interactions with journalists—or contain internally contradictory
instructions that would confuse a reasonable reader. In no case do any of
the fifty-eight speech-restrictive policies incorporate any procedural
safeguards, such as a process by which an aggrieved officer who wanted
to speak to the media could appeal a refusal to approve an interview.
While some law enforcement agency policies leave officers considerable
discretion to speak—and at times, even encourage sharing information—
those seventeen policies (23% of those reviewed) are in the minority.
A.

Blanket Prohibitions on Speaking Without Approval

When a police department policy entirely prohibits speaking to the
media or requires supervisory approval without exception before
121. S HELLEY S. HYLAND & ELIZABETH DAVIS, DOJ, B UREAU OF JUST. S TAT., NCJ 252835,
LOCAL P OLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2016: P ERSONNEL (Oct. 2019), https://www.bjs.ojp.gov/content/
pub/pdf/lpd16p.pdf [https://perma.cc/KBX6-7TPL].
122. The relatively low response rate is at least in part attributable to two factors: First, the
requests were transmitted during a time when agencies were still largely in “work-from-home” mode
during the global COVID-19 pandemic, and second, several of the target agencies were located in
states (Alabama, Tennessee, Virginia) that enforce a “residents-only” standard for honoring requests
for public records.
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discussing work-related matters with the public, the policy faces dual
infirmities. First, it may run afoul of the prohibition recognized by the
Supreme Court in NTEU against categorical prior restraints on speech.
Second, it may fail to protect the ability to engage in speech as a citizen
on matters of public concern, which the Supreme Court recognized as
constitutionally protected in Pickering (and reaffirmed in Lane).
A policy that forbids officers from speaking publicly without their
agency’s approval has been recognized as a prior restraint, which “bears
a heavier presumption against constitutionality than one that merely
penalizes people who have already spoken.” 123 Even the mere delay in
being able to speak to a time-sensitive matter, such as a fast-breaking news
story, can constitute irreparable harm for purposes of a First Amendment
claim. 124 Prior restraints are considered to be per se injurious, and any
“regulation conditioning [the right to speak] on obtaining the prior
permission of the public employer is presumptively invalid.” 125 There is
a qualitative distinction between policies that merely suggest that
journalists contact the public information office as their first point of
contact, which are constitutionally unobjectionable, versus policies
indicating that officers are required to refrain from answering questions
from journalists, which the caselaw regards as an impermissible restraint.
But many law enforcement agencies fail to make that distinction.
New York City, home to the nation’s largest police force with more
than 36,000 full-time officers, 126 is also home to one of the most
controlling media policies—despite binding circuit-level legal precedent
finding restrictive speech policies unconstitutional. 127 The New York
Police Department tells officers that they are forbidden from “[d]ivulging
or discussing official Department business, except as authorized.”128 A
policy requiring authorization to discuss anything about “official
Department business” unmistakably encompasses at least some
constitutionally protected speech, and New York’s policy is
indistinguishable from those found unconstitutional elsewhere. 129
123. Providence Firefighters Loc. 799 v. City of Providence, 26 F. Supp. 2d 350, 355 (D.R.I.
1998).
124. See id. at 354 (recognizing that prior restraints inhibiting speakers’ opportunity to be heard
“for even minimal amounts of time constitute not only injury, but irreparable injury”).
125. Parow v. Kinnon, 300 F. Supp. 2d 256, 264 (D. Mass. 2004).
126. HYLAND & DAVIS, supra note 123, at 14.
127. Harman v. City of New York, 140 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 1998).
128. N.Y.C. P OLICE DEP’T, P ATROL GUIDE, P ROCEDURE NO. 203-10, 1 (2016).
129. See Lauretano v. Spada, 339 F. Supp. 2d 391, 415 (D. Conn. 2004) (highway patrol
department violated employees’ First Amendment rights by requiring approval for “official comments
relative to department policy”); Parow, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 260 (fire department violated employees’
First Amendment rights by requiring approval for any statements for publication “concerning the
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New York’s policy is no outlier. Comparable gags exist at law
enforcement agencies across the country. The Phoenix Police Department
policy provides that officers can speak to the media when designated to
do so by supervisors, but “under no circumstances will information be
released without first obtaining permission.” 130 The St. Louis Police
Department has one of the nation’s most explicit gag policies, stating, in
boldface type: “No Department employee will speak to the news media
without proper authorization. . . . Any violations are subject to
disciplinary action.” 131 Officers in Greenville County, South Carolina, are
held to the same restrictive speech policy as all other county employees:
“All information (requested or otherwise) provided to any media outlet or
to any individual or group who intends to display such communication in
a public forum on any topic must first be viewed and approved by the
Administrator’s Office and the Governmental Affairs Coordinator.” 132
Prohibitions against unapproved communications with journalists
take many forms, including:
•
•

“Officers shall direct all requests for information and
interviews to the [Office of Media Relations].” (Boston
Police Department) 133
“No unauthorized personnel will reach out to the media and
provide information pertaining to the Memphis Police
Department, ongoing/closed investigation or personal
endeavors without the approval of the PIO. . . . Media outlets
must submit requests for information through the PIO prior
to the release of information.” (Memphis Police
Department) 134

plans, policies, or affairs of the administration of the fire department”); Spain v. City of Mansfield,
915 F. Supp. 919, 922 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (fire department violated employees’ First Amendment rights
by requiring approval for comments on “Fire Department rules, duties, policies, procedures and
practices”); Grady v. Blair, 529 F. Supp. 370, 371 n.1 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (fire department violated
employees’ First Amendment rights by requiring approval for statements to the media “relating to fire
department activities”).
130. P HX. P OLICE DEP’T, OPERATIONS ORDERS § 5.2, 1 (2017).
131. C ITY OF S T. LOUIS OFF. OF THE P OLICE C OMM’R, S PECIAL ORDER SO 6-03, P UBLIC
INFORMATION P OLICY (2018) (produced in response to request, copy on file with authors).
132. GREENVILLE C NTY., P ERSONNEL HANDBOOK § 5.12 (2014)
133. B OSTON P OLICE DEP’T, R ULE 300, OFFICE OF MEDIA R ELATIONS-R ELEASE OF OFFICIAL
INFORMATION § 9 (2015). The policy does allow certain senior officers to release “routine”
information without need for permission, but cautions that if the request seems to cross the line into
an “interview,” even a senior officer should consult the media relations office before speaking. Id. §§
10, 11.
134. MEMPHIS P OLICE DEP’T, MEMPHIS P OLICE DEPARTMENT P OLICIES & P ROCEDURES § 7
(2016).
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“Non-authorized personnel shall not provide any substantive
information to the media.” (Seattle Police Department) 135
“Requests for public information from the media should be
referred to a public information officer or ranking
supervisor.” (Broward County, Florida, Sheriff’s Office)136

Rigorous First Amendment scrutiny of pre-speech restraints is
essential because of the substantial risk these restraints present of inviting
viewpoint-based discrimination. A police department supervisor is highly
unlikely to grant permission for a known malcontent or whistleblower to
give an interview if advance permission is required, so the temptation to
selectively withhold approval for image-maintenance purposes is selfevident. An officer should not be forced to calibrate a Pickering-type
balance to determine whether an act of whistleblowing—which could
certainly provoke strong disagreements in the workplace—will lose First
Amendment protection depending on the degree of public outrage it
incites. Sometimes the point of whistleblowing is to incite a strong
adverse public reaction—which is why the speech-protective NTEU
analysis is the right one for a blanket prohibition of the type that is on the
books in New York and elsewhere throughout the country. Without the
ability to express views contrary to those of the department’s official
position, officers would be unable to bring abuses or shortcomings to
light, including concerns about their own safety.
Any policy that gives supervisors unbridled discretion to prevent
officers from speaking is a prior restraint. 137 To withstand constitutional
scrutiny, such a regulation must contain narrow and objective standards
for review. 138 Otherwise, the danger that “unfettered discretion, coupled
with the power of prior restraint, [will] intimidat[e] parties into censoring
their own speech” will be too great, and a wide range of speech will
unnecessarily and unconstitutionally be censored. 139 None of the policies
that require supervisory approval for speaking to the media contain either
standards to cabin the authority of decisionmakers to grant or deny
permission to speak, or any procedural safeguards such as a maximum
turnaround time during which supervisors must act on a request for access.
135. S EATTLE P OLICE DEP’T, S EATTLE P OLICE DEPARTMENT MANUAL § 1.110 (2017).
136. B ROWARD C NTY. S HERIFF’S OFFICE, S HERIFF’S P OLICY MANUAL, R ULE 5.3 (2016)
(produced in response to request, copy on file with authors).
137. Spain v. City of Mansfield, 915 F. Supp. 919, 923 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (citing City of
Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988)).
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 763).
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Lacking these safeguards, policies such as those on the books in New
York, Phoenix, and St. Louis invite supervisors to make content- or
viewpoint-discriminatory decisions, such as allowing officers known to
be loyal only to the agency’s “party line” to participate in interviews, or
approving only interviews that involve routine and uncontroversial
subjects.
B.

Policies Lacking Clarity That Exist in a Constitutional Gray Zone

While many police department policies unequivocally require
employer approval for all interactions with the news media, other policies
are more nuanced, leaving open the possibility that officers may have
latitude to speak freely when they are off duty or when they are not
addressing especially confidential police business. “Tailoring” may make
these type of policies constitutionally defensible against an overbreadth
challenge—but they still may flunk First Amendment scrutiny if they are
unduly vague. If a reasonable officer would be uncertain whether speech
is or is not constitutionally protected against punishment, the regulation
would predictably “chill” officers into silencing themselves. 140
Some law enforcement agency policies, rather than forbidding all
communication with the press and public, selectively restrict certain
categories of speech. For instance, the Louisville Police Department
specifies that only the agency’s Media and Public Relations Office may
respond to requests for “general information regarding the department
. . . .” 141 Officers in Austin must have approval from a public information
officer before distributing any “controversial” information to the
media. 142 The Oakland County, Michigan, Sheriff’s Department requires
employees to refer “all requests on major incidents” to the public
information officer or that person’s designee rather than answering the
requests themselves. 143 These policies leave decisive terms—such as
“major,” “controversial,” or “general information”—undefined. A policy

140. See Speech First, Inc. v. Killeen, 968 F.3d 628, 638 (7th Cir. 2020) (stating that a First
Amendment plaintiff may establish injury, even without suffering punitive action, by showing “a
chilling effect on his speech that is objectively reasonable, and that he self-censors as a result”).
141. LOUISVILLE METRO P OLICE DEP’T, S TANDARD OPERATING P ROCEDURES, No. 3.3 (2018)
(produced in response to request, copy on file with authors).
142. AUSTIN P OLICE DEP’T, GENERAL ORDER 326, NEWS AND MEDIA R ELATIONS (2020).
143. OAKLAND C NTY. S HERIFF’S DEP’T, GENERAL ORDER NO. 4, GUIDELINES FOR MEDIA
R ELATIONS; P OLICE AND THE MEDIA(2001) (produced in response to request, copy on file with
authors).
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that fails to provide clear notice of what speech is or is not publishable
may be vulnerable to challenge as unconstitutionally vague. 144
The Miami–Dade Police Department’s policy, in particular, is a
minefield for the unwary speaker. The policy begins by saying that the
Public Information Office is responsible for releasing “[g]eneral
information concerning police activities . . . .” 145 However, employees are
allowed to speak about “cases or information of which they possess
firsthand knowledge, provided the ends of justice are not thereby defeated,
impaired, or impeded.” 146 But only the chief or a designee may speak to
the media about “plans, policies, or affairs of the administration” of the
department. 147 Separately from the agency’s media policy, the
department’s disciplinary code says officers will be punished for
“[c]ommunicating or giving police information to any person concerning
the business of the Department, which is detrimental to the Department,
without prior approval or authorization by a commanding officer.”148 The
sum total of these rules is that an officer presented with an opportunity to
address a police department matter must assess whether the question seeks
general information about department activities, whether the question
concerns departmental plans or policies, whether the response calls for
disclosing information detrimental to the department, or whether the
response would disserve the interests of justice—and if any of those things
are true, then giving the answer will be a punishable offense. The
predictable outcome of such a confusing policy is that officers simply will
not speak at all.
Employees at New York’s Suffolk County Police Department, which
handles policing in five towns in eastern Long Island with a force of some
2,700 officers, would face a similar quandry. 149 A departmental media
relations directive first states that officers must contact the department’s
Crime Stoppers or public information office before replying to any media
inquiry that is “not related to an issued press release or a developing
situation . . . .” 150 The directive later goes on to state: “No Department
144. See Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (a statute penalizing speech is subject to
vagueness challenge if it “fail[s] to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to
understand what conduct it prohibits”).
145. MIAMI -DADE P OLICE DEP’T, DEPARTMENTAL ORDER 1, OFFICE OF THE C HIEF § 11.6.26.3
(2021).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. § 11.6.17.24.
149. Public Safety, S UFFOLK C NTY. P OLICE DEP’T, https://www.suffolkcountyny.gov/publicsafety [https://perma.cc/RX63-KLFA].
150. S UFFOLK C NTY. P OLICE DEP’T, DEPARTMENT GENERAL ORDER NO. 13-58, MEDIA
R ELATIONS (2013).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron,

29

Akron Law Review, Vol. 55 [], Iss. 1, Art. 1

30

AKRON LAW R EVIEW

[55:1

member shall speak to the media about a developing situation before first
contacting the Crime Stoppers and the Public Information Bureau.”151 The
combined effect of these directives—that officers must get approval
before speaking (1) unless the situation is developing, or (2) if the situation
is developing—seems almost purposefully calculated to confuse.
Los Angeles, the nation’s third-largest police department with more
than 9,800 full-time officers, 152 maintains a policy that seems to
differentiate between scheduled interviews, which require supervisory
approval in all cases, versus providing information to journalists on an
unscheduled basis, for which officers appear to have considerable
discretion. The department instructs officers:
Requests for Department cooperation in the preparation of articles for
newspapers, magazines, and other publications will be individually
considered, and, if approved, permission for the interviewing of
Department personnel and the photographing of police facilities will be
limited to the scope of approval. Officers participating in the preparation
of such articles should ascertain the scope of approval and should be
cautious not to exceed those limits. 153

Perhaps ironically, Los Angeles begins its media policy with an
aspirational preface about the importance of candor with the press—
before specifying that interviews must be approved in advance:
One of the first and most fundamental considerations of this nation’s
founders in drafting the Bill of Rights was to provide for a free press as
an essential element of the First Amendment to the Constitution. They
recognized that a well-informed citizenry is vital to the effective
functioning of a democracy. Police operations profoundly affect the
public and therefore arouse substantial public interest. Likewise, public
interest and public cooperation bear significantly on the successful
accomplishment of any police mission. The police should make every
reasonable effort to serve the needs of the media in informing the public
about crime and other police problems. This should be done with an
attitude of openness and frankness whenever possible. The media should
have access to personnel, at the lowest level in a Department, who are
fully informed about the subject of a press inquiry.154

Outside of the “interviewing” setting, the policy suggests that officers
have latitude to furnish information to the media; they are told to use “care
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
HYLAND & DAVIS, supra note 123.
L.A. P OLICE DEP’T, 2020 3RD QUARTER DEPARTMENT MANUAL, § 440.30.
Id. § 115.
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and discretion” when speaking to the media so they are not misquoted, but
otherwise are given leeway in deciding what to speak about. 155 The LAPD
cautions officers against making public remarks critical of the criminal
justice system but states that personal views may be expressed, even if
they are critical. 156 The Tucson, Arizona police policy manual makes a
similar distinction between “appearances or interviews regarding police
matters or department business,” which require supervisory approval,
versus providing “information of a factual nature” at a crime scene, which
does not. 157
As a matter of First Amendment law, it probably is permissible for a
law enforcement agency to exercise control over speech if a journalist
contacts the agency and asks the department to choose an officer to make
available to be interviewed. If the agency offers a particular interviewee,
it could reasonably be understood that the officer is serving as a
spokesperson, and the officer’s speech could be regarded as delivered
pursuant to official duties, bringing it within the ambit of the Supreme
Court’s Garcetti standard. However, “interview” could also encompass a
journalist tracking down an officer after-hours in search of a personal
opinion drawing on the officer’s experience and knowledge—the type of
speech that, under an NTEU analysis, should be beyond the agency’s
authority to interdict. A prohibition on unapproved “interviewing,” then,
occupies a doubtful gray area.
A comparably vague policy is in place in Houston. The policy
provides that officers may not make “statements about departmental
policy or initiatives” without getting the statements approved—with an
exception for statements made in emergency situations—but otherwise
explicitly permits sharing “personal opinions.” 158 A prohibition on
speaking about police matters could inhibit officers from speaking about
pay and working conditions; policies that address choke-holds, stun-gun
use, or other public safety concerns; or even publicly defending
themselves if implicated in wrongdoing. A whistleblower interested in
going to the press or public could reasonably interpret a prohibition
against discussing “policy or initiatives” to cover concerns about, for
instance, the way officers use force or whether officers are being given
adequate training or safety equipment.

155. Id. § 440.40.
156. Id. § 480.20.
157. TUCSON P OLICE DEP’T, GENERAL ORDER 3060, MEDIA AND P UBLIC INFORMATION
P OLICIES (2001) (produced in response to request, copy on file with authors).
158. HOUS. P OLICE DEP’T, GENERAL ORDER NO. 800-02, MEDIA R ELATIONS (2020).
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These side-effects are not merely speculative: Ex-officer Kenneth
Mitchell was removed from duty when he went public with concerns
about potentially dangerous understaffing issues in the Houston Police
Department. 159 Mitchell sent the disputed email from his personal
account, while he was off duty, detailing the slower response times that
residents of a particular neighborhood were facing as a result of the
closure of their local substation. 160 Following an internal investigation,
Mitchell was given the choice between a dishonorable discharge and
resignation. 161 Mitchell’s lawyer told reporters that, while it may be
inconvenient that officers have opinions, their First Amendment
protections supersede police policy. 162 Though Houston’s policy seems to
favor free speech, the extent of that right is called into question by the
sometimes sharply circumscribed limits on what officers are actually
allowed to discuss with the media and how practice may differ from
policy.
Whether policies are vague or internally inconsistent, officers will be
left wondering whether their speech will be protected—with their careers
at risk if they guess wrong. When a policy appears internally selfcontradictory, a speaker predictably will remain silent for fear that a
supervisor will enforce the more restrictive interpretation. Functionally,
then, a vague or ambiguous policy can be as speech-restrictive as an
outright prohibition.
Even policies that are relatively speech-permissive at times contain
constitutional red flags because they can fail to differentiate between onduty and off-duty speech in a way likely to inhibit constitutionally
protected speech in an officer’s individual capacity. For example, the
Kern County Sheriff’s Office, serving the Bakersfield area of Southern
California, generally encourages employees to cooperate with the news
media and enumerates, in detail, the types of case-related information that
are subject to release. 163 But the department’s media policy also states:
Statements of Sheriff’s Office policy, official positions of the agency,
officialresponses to criticism of the agency, comments critical of another
department, agency, institution or public official, or statements

159. Gabrielle Banks, Houston Officer Who Questioned Police Staffing Files Free Speech Suit
After He Was Forced Out, HOUS. C HRON. (Dec. 20, 2018, 1:46 PM), https://www.chron.com/
news/houston-texas/houston/article/Houston-officer-who-questioned-police-staffing-13479070.php
[https://perma.cc/K5D5-2YLX].
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. KERN C NTY. S HERIFF’S OFF., P OLICIES & P ROCEDURES NO. I-100 (2018).
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pertaining to pending or ongoing litigation involving the Sheriff’s
Office, shall be made only by a command officer or other individuals
designated by the Sheriff-Coroner. 164

A law enforcement agency obviously cannot enforce a viewpointdiscriminatory rule that restricts employees from making comments
“critical” of any agency or official at any level of government (even, for
instance, criticizing the White House), or punish them for doing so.
Except when made in the course of official duties, such comments would
be close to the heart of the political speech that the Constitution most
fiercely protects. Restricting only speech “critical” of the government
would be quite difficult to defend on constitutional grounds. If the policy
is meant to avoid entangling officers in contested political disputes, it is
inadequately tailored to that objective because it would permit laudatory
comments about government agencies or officials, such as endorsing the
mayor for re-election—but not urging the mayor’s defeat.
A variation on the prior-approval policy that avoids some of the
worst constitutional infirmities of a prior restraint is a policy requiring
after-the-fact notice to the employer. The Contra Costa County Sheriff’s
Office in California, for example, tells employees:
Any Sheriff Office employee who has contact or interactions with the
media will report that contact up through his or her immediate chain of
command, who will provide this information to the Sheriff for
operational awareness. The Public Information Officer will also be
notified. This will be done as soon as practical, normally within 4
hours. 165

The Las Vegas and Portland police manuals contain a similar after-thefact notification requirement, 166 while the Tampa Police Department
policy requires advance notification (though unlike common gag policies,
not phrased in terms of “approval”) before an officer may speak. 167 A
post-interview notification policy would not be a classic prior restraint
because the speaker can speak first and furnish notice afterward.
Nevertheless, the practical effect of a notification requirement is to make
164. Id.
165. C ONTRA C OSTA C NTY. OFF. OF THE SHERIFF, P OLICY AND PROCEDURES MANUAL § 1.06.78
(2021).
166. LAS VEGAS METRO. P OLICE DEP’T, DEPARTMENT MANUAL § 5/107.24 (2007); P ORTLAND
P OLICE B UREAU, DIRECTIVES MANUAL § 0631.35.
167. TAMPA P OLICE DEP’T, S TANDARD OPERATING P ROCEDURES § 540 (2019) (“[S]ubject to
certain exceptions, no employee is prohibited from speaking with media personnel, but all employees
must coordinate with and notify the Public Information Office prior to communicating with the
media.”).
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it a punishable offense to provide journalists information on a not-forattribution basis—as Colleen Ryan did in Minneapolis—because an
officer who insists on the protection of anonymity obviously does not
wish to expose her identity to her supervisor, either before speaking or
afterward. Thus, a mandatory notice requirement can be read as
effectively prohibiting anonymous speech, placing it in a constitutional
gray area. 168
C. Narrowly Tailored Policies
A handful of the policies gathered and reviewed by the Brechner
Center adhere to prevailing First Amendment standards as developed by
the federal courts. These policies regulate with narrow specificity and
leave ample opportunity for employees to share non-confidential
information without fear of discipline. For example, the Philadelphia
Police Department’s news media policy tells officers to provide the media
with as much information as possible, unless doing so would put
someone’s safety at risk or interfere with an active investigation. 169 Any
officer is allowed to speak to the media, though certain information is
designated as off-limits for release (such as the names of juveniles or sex
crime victims) or requires supervisory approval before release (such as
detailed information about arrestees) on the basis of privacy concerns. 170
Other jurisdictions, too, have policies with clearly delineated
standards that do not leave officers guessing when they are approached by
members of the press. The Detroit Police Department is among a small
minority that affirmatively assures officers they are free to speak to the
press: “All members of the Detroit Police Department have the right to
answer questions from the news media on matters of which they have
direct personal knowledge,” with the exception of certain sensitive
information at crime scenes that is identified as non-releasable. 171 San
Antonio, similarly, instructs officers that they are free to release nine
specified categories of basic factual information about incidents to which
they respond, such as the location and nature of a crime and a description

168. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (stating that “an
author’s decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the
content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment”).
169. P HILA. P OLICE DEP’T, DIRECTIVE 4.16, MEDIA R ELATIONS AND R ELEASE OF INFORMATION
TO THE P UBLIC (2015).
170. Id.
171. DETROIT P OLICE DEP’T, DETROIT P OLICE DEPARTMENT MANUAL, AT DIRECTIVE 302.5
(2008).
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of the suspect, without needing supervisory approval. 172 The policy goes
on to state that responses to certain types of media inquiries, such as “the
interpretation of departmental policy or procedures,” are to be made only
by the police chief or a designee. 173 The policy thus directly addresses one
of the primary concerns raised by gag policies—promoting the flow of
timely information about crimes and safety hazards—while remaining
silent as to the extent to which officers are free to venture opinions about
work-related matters without needing approval.
Of all of the policies reviewed, the Cleveland Police Department
provides the most detailed distinction between speech in an official
capacity (which is tightly controlled) versus speech in an individual
capacity (which is not). 174 The department tells officers that they must
obtain written permission before giving an interview in uniform or as a
representative of the agency—and explains how to get permission—but
that they are free to speak during off-hours as long as they are off police
premises, out of uniform, and expressly state that they are speaking in a
personal capacity and that their views do not reflect the views of the
department. 175
Clearly constitutional policies invariably get three things right: they
provide clear checklists identifying subcategories of sensitive information
that cannot be released because of the potential to harm the justice system,
crime victims, or witnesses; they differentiate between employercontrolled speech when acting as a department spokesperson versus
speech in an individual capacity; and they affirmatively provide discretion
to release information outside of the categories that legitimately qualify
as confidential. The fact that some large metropolitan law enforcement
agencies maintain relatively speech-permissive policies undermines any
contention that police departments need total control over officers’ speech
to operate effectively. Plainly, it is possible to operate a law enforcement
agency with relatively minimal control over what officers say and with
boundaries that respect their ability to speak off duty in their citizen role.
While it is valuable to examine and question the on-the-books
policies of law enforcement agencies, official rulebooks tell only part of
the story. Officers are often under the impression they are entirely
forbidden from speaking, even if no such restriction appears on the page,
172. S AN ANTONIO P OLICE DEP’T. GENERAL MANUAL, AT P ROCEDURE 307 §§ 307.04–.06
(2010).
173. Id.
174. C LEVELAND DIV. OF P OLICE, GENERAL P OLICE ORDERS § 1.3.01 (2002) (produced in
response to request, copy on file with authors).
175. Id.
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because of powerful, unwritten workplace norms. For instance, the
Chicago Police Department’s formal written policies do not require all
interactions with journalists to be approved in advance. 176 Rather, the
Chicago policy requires approval only if the officer is “acting as an
official representative” of the police department. 177 An off-duty interview
requires no approval, as long as officers make clear that they are
expressing personal opinions. 178 Nevertheless, Chicago officers have said
they believe they are categorically prohibited from speaking without
approval, so the perceived prohibition exerts the same chilling effect as if
a prohibition actually existed. 179 For this reason, a survey of police
rulebooks undoubtedly understates the true scope of the gagging problem,
and any solution must recognize both the constitutional defects in written
standards as well as the powerful deterrent effect of unwritten
“standards.”
VI. THE ARGUMENT FOR HANDCUFFING OFFICER SPEECH
Because police are handling sensitive information that can bear on
their own safety and that of the public, the law at times recognizes that the
public’s right-to-know may be subordinated to the agency’s legitimate
objectives. For instance, the federal Freedom of Information Act and its
state counterparts recognize some latitude for law enforcement agencies
to withhold records, which would otherwise be publicly accessible, when
they contain information that might compromise ongoing
investigations. 180 The need for a degree of regimentation in public safety
176. C HICAGO P OLICE DEP’T, S PECIAL ORDER S09-02, NEWS MEDIA GUIDELINES (2004).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See Patrick Smith, Chicago Police Turn Down City-Provided COVID-19 Vaccine, WBEZ
C HI . (May 3, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.wbez.org/stories/chicago-police-turn-down-ci t y provided-covid-19-vaccine/9909c907-37bb-4dc5-adb0 -feb7 f3278c94
[https://perma.cc/X4G84YBV] (stating that Chicago officers interviewed about hesitancy to take the COVID-19 vaccine
“spoke with WBEZ on the condition of anonymity because they are not allowed to speak with the
media”); Patrick Smith, Chicago Police Officer Posts on Facebook ‘Work, Hustle, Kill.’ CPD Still
Investigating After 15 Months, WBEZ C HI . (July 20, 2020 6:00 AM), https://www.wbez.org/
stories/chicago-police-officer-posts-on-facebook-wo rk-hustle-kill-cpd -still-investigating-after-15months/2fb03618-349d-4b06-8120-65a0789f60dc [https://perma.cc/2YDR-5H3D] (stating that
officer under lengthy unresolved investigation for disturbingly violent social media posts “is not
allowed to speak to the media because of department rules that bar officers from talking to the press”).
180. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (permitting federal law enforcement agencies to turn down FOIA
requests for records that would “reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, ”
invade personal privacy, compromise confidential informants, or otherwise give away missioncritical confidences); see also Steven D. Zansberg & Pamela Campos, Sunshine on the Thin Blue
Line: Public Access to Police Internal Affairs Files, 22 C OMM’NS. L. 34, 35 (2004) (observing that
“most state statutes follow FOIA by including an exemption for investigatory records”).
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officer ranks has often been recognized as a justification for
compromising their individual expressive interests. 181 For instance, rigid
restrictions on attire and grooming that might not be permissible in an
ordinary government office setting are countenanced within public safety
agencies. 182
The fact that police and sheriff’s departments across the United
States insist on filtering employee communications with the news media
indicates that these agencies believe they have a legitimate interest in
controlling the flow of information about police matters. Courts have
recognized that, as with any workplace, law enforcement employers have
legitimate needs to maintain harmony among coworkers, prevent the
release of legally protected confidences, and “encourage close and
personal relationships between employees and their superiors.”183
Undoubtedly, some information handled by law enforcement agencies is
legitimately off-limits for distribution to the general public on safety
grounds (such as the names of confidential police informants) or privacy
grounds (such as the names of young children who are cited for offenses
of no public importance). The careless release of sensitive investigatory
information can compromise resolving cases or even put lives at risk, 184
so policies that are narrowly tailored to restrict only the dissemination of
critical investigative information are constitutionally unobjectionable.
181. See Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 300 (4th Cir. 1992) (contrasting considerable
First Amendment protection afforded to speech of college professors with relatively more limited
freedom afforded to police officers: “Police are at the restricted end of the spectrum because they are
‘paramilitary’—discipline is demanded, and freedom must be correspondingly denied.”); Kannisto v.
City of San Francisco, 541 F.2d 841, 843 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that “a prohibition against the
communication of an officer’s disaffection to rank-and-file members of the department during regular
duty hours may be considered as a necessary adjunct to the department’s substantial interest in
maintaining discipline, morale and uniformity”).
182. See, e.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 248 (1976) (affording highly deferential review
in upholding constitutionality of police department’s regulation on hair length and facial hair, which
could be justified “based on a desire to make police officers readily recognizable to the members of
the public, or a desire for the esprit de corps which such similarity is felt to inculcate within the police
force itself”).
183. Hall v. Mayor of Pennsauken Twp., 422 A.2d 797, 799 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980).
184. See, e.g., Rafael Olmeda, In a Rare Move, Cop Faces a Criminal Leak Investigation, S.
F LA. S UN S ENTINEL (Oct. 30, 2019, 8:36 AM), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/
broward/sunrise/fl-ne-sunrise-police-ia-roger-krege-20191030 -r7uv4xkqjrfi5d7ku5hw23y w6ystory.html [https://perma.cc/W9YC-9RYM] (reporting that a police sergeant’s leak of confidential
investigative information to the local newspaper compromised the location of the base of operations
for an undercover drug investigation, forcing officers to relocate); see also Michael James, Denver
Pair Executed Robbery Witness After Court System Mistakenly Released His Identity, USA TODAY
(Feb. 22, 2019, 9:21 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/02/21/robbersexecuted-witness-after-court-mistake-life-witness/2945462002/
[https://perma.cc/BM7Q-KREQ]
(reporting that a Denver man was shot and killed in front of his home when documents identifying
him as a witness to a robbery were mistakenly released to the public).
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Police have a legitimate interest in making sure that critical publicsafety information is accurate and consistent, so that, for instance, an order
to evacuate an area is communicated uniformly without mixed messages.
Legitimate concerns have been raised, too, about police and prosecutors
gratuitously volunteering damaging information about people hurt or
killed by police in an effort to rationalize a questionable decision to use
force, and perhaps influence a future jury to devalue the life of the victim
if the case ends up in court. 185 For these reasons, there are defensible
arguments that public safety agencies need greater latitude to control the
flow of information than, for instance, a county parks department.
The Ninth Circuit’s Moonin case offered something of a roadmap for
how law enforcement agencies rationalize exerting control over what
employees say to the press and public. The highway patrol offered three
rationales to justify the restriction: protecting sensitive information
relating to drug enforcement, controlling the department’s messages to
outsiders, and ensuring effective operation of the department without
interference from outsiders. 186 Although the court found these to be
legitimate government interests, 187 “efficiency grounded in the avoidance
of accountability is not, in a democracy, a supervening value” that would
justify overbroad restraints on speech. 188 Any prior restraints on speech
must be narrowly tailored and have a “close and rational” relationship to
the subject of the speech, the judges wrote, and the Nevada Highway
Patrol’s rule against any discussion of the agency’s use of police dogs did
not meet that test. 189
The asserted interests of policing agencies do not support the
conclusion that all interactions between officers and the public must be
intermediated, for two primary reasons. First, it is possible to craft a more
narrowly tailored policy that asserts control over only the critical subset
185. Sam Levin, Killed by Police, then Vilified: How America’s Prosecutors Blame Victims,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 21, 2019, 2:07 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/mar/20/uspolice-killings-district-attorney-prosecutor-reports [https://perma.cc/Q7W2-USV5].
186. Moonin v. Tice, 868 F.3d 853, 865 (9th Cir. 2017).
187. Id. at 865–66.
188. Id. at 866.
189. Id. at 867 (quoting Gibson v. Office of the Att’y Gen., 561 F.3d 920, 928 (9th Cir. 2009)).
To underscore the public importance of access to information about the use of police dogs, The
Marshall Project, an investigative news organization focused on criminal justice and corrections, won
widespread acclaim for a 2020 series of stories about how police have, at times, unleashed dogs to
attack suspects in questionable circumstances even after the pursuit was concluded, sometimes
inflicting disabling injuries. Abbie VanSickle, Maurice Chammah, Michelle Pitcher, Damini Sharma,
Andrew Calderon & David Eads, Mauled: When Police Dogs Are Weapons, MARSHALL P ROJECT
(Oct. 15, 2020), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/10/15/mauled-when-police-dogs-areweapons [https://perma.cc/GGT3-J98G].
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of speech that can lawfully be regulated to protect the agency’s legitimate
interests, including the integrity of confidential information in the
agency’s custody. Second, agencies still have the authority recognized in
the Supreme Court’s Pickering line of cases to discipline speakers for
especially harmful instances of speech that undermine the agency’s
effectiveness, without categorically gagging all speakers.
A. Less Speech-Restrictive Remedies Exist
Courts have found narrowly tailored policies that restrict officer
speech to be constitutionally permissible. In adjudicating a First
Amendment challenge, a federal court applied a narrow construction to
the Washington, D.C., Police Department’s media policy, which stated in
part: “Only the Chief of Police, Command staff and members designated
by them may release information pertaining to Department policies,
procedures, rules, personnel issues and direction.” 190 Although the
prohibition appeared broad, the judge interpreted the prohibition in
context with the remainder of the rulebook, which in the judge’s view,
clearly governed only speech delivered “pursuant to official duties,” such
as making a press statement on behalf of the department. 191 With that
narrow understanding, the policy was facially constitutional. Because the
policy applied only to official-duty speech, and the plaintiff was punished
for speech outside of official duty—giving an interview to The
Washington Post on behalf of the police officers’ union—he ended up
winning the case. 192
Similarly, a Connecticut police department’s media policy survived
a First Amendment challenge because it was tailored to formal releases of
information to the news media and to information that would not be
publicly accessible under state law, such as information about ongoing
criminal investigations. 193 This left room for police department employees
to express their views as individuals, including views about police
matters, as long as no confidences were compromised. 194 Once again, the
plaintiff officer prevailed on the merits of his as-applied challenge
190. Hawkins v. District of Columbia, 923 F. Supp. 2d 128, 135–36 (D.D.C. 2013).
191. Id. at 136.
192. Id. at 143.
193. Shelton Police Union, Inc. v. Voccola, 125 F. Supp. 2d 604, 624–25 (D. Conn. 2001).
194. The challenged policy provided, in full: “To avoid confusion and conflict in the release of
information, all formal releases to the press are to be disseminated through the media relations’ officer
assigned by the Chief of Police or in the absence of such media relations’ officer by the commanding
officer. No member of the department shall release any information relating to pending investigations
or any information not otherwise available to the public if such information is exempt from public
disclosure pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act.” Id. at 608.
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because the speech for which he was punished—criticizing “racial
comments made by the Chief of Police, conflicts of interest within the
police department, and the general operation and management of the
police department”—fell outside the legitimate reach of the prohibition.195
Even some successful facial challenges to overbroad policies have
recognized that better-tailored restrictions can be constitutional. For
instance, while it was found to be unconstitutional for a Massachusetts
police department to forbid discussing anything about agency policy, the
department could lawfully enforce a narrower prohibition against speech
that “is intended to undermine the effectiveness of the Department, is
insubordinate, or is made with reckless disregard for truth or falsity.” 196
As these cases demonstrate, it is eminently possible for a law
enforcement agency to craft a constitutionally permissible employeespeech policy that protects confidential information critical to agency
operations and prevents employees from misleadingly holding themselves
out as official spokespeople, while leaving ample breathing space for
officers to share information and ideas.
B. Supervisors Have Adequate Speech-Specific Enforcement Power
Public safety agencies have ample legal authority to penalize
especially egregious instances of disloyal or unprofessional speech
without resorting to an all-out prohibition on speaking with the press and
public. It is well-established under the Pickering standard that a public
employee’s speech loses First Amendment protection and becomes
punishable when it undermines the credibility of the agency or casts
serious doubt on the employee’s own ability to fairly and impartially
discharge the duties of a position of public trust. 197 Examples abound in
which public safety agencies have prevailed in First Amendment
challenges brought by disciplined officers who spoke—or in more recent
years, tweeted—in ways that reasonably would cause coworkers or the
public to distrust their professional judgment.

195. Id. at 627–34.
196. Wagner v. City of Holyoke, 100 F. Supp. 2d 78, 86–87 (D. Mass. 2000).
197. See Gasparinetti v. Kerr, 568 F.2d 311, 315–16 (3d Cir. 1977) (applying Pickering in First
Amendment case brought by disciplined police union leader and stating: “We can recognize a
significant government interest in regulating some speech of police officers in order to promote
efficiency, foster loyalty and obedience to superior officers, maintain morale, and instill public
confidence in the law enforcement institution. To achieve these ends, regulations may be
promulgated, but their restrictive effect may extend only as far as is necessary to accomplish a
legitimate governmental interest.”).
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Courts have rebuffed First Amendment claims brought by public
safety officers for making remarks on social media indicating a violent
disposition toward political opponents, 198 operating a hardcore sex
website and making personal appearances in the community to promote
the site, 199 appearing at a police Halloween party costumed in blackface
and carrying a watermelon, 200 and selling videos of sex acts in (and
partially out of) a police uniform. 201 In none of these cases, and dozens
more like them, have courts been willing to second-guess the disciplinary
judgments of public safety agencies once it is shown that an employee’s
expression actually undermined workplace effectiveness.
Law enforcement supervisors have especially broad authority to
regulate individual instances of disruptive speech because so much speech
is regarded as being part of an officer’s “official duties,” bringing it within
the ambit of the Supreme Court’s Garcetti rule. 202 Once speech is
considered to be part of an official work assignment, it ceases being the
constitutionally protected employee speech under Garcetti and becomes
attributable to the employer, meaning that the agency can freely regulate
it. 203 For example, when a Milwaukee police officer was demoted after
lodging a complaint with the state prosecutor’s office that a supervisory
officer had helped her fugitive brother evade arrest, the complaint was
deemed to be unprotected speech. 204 Since department policy required
officers to report all crimes of which they were aware, and because the
complaint took place during an official business meeting, the court
deemed the report was a part of official duties, and thus not protected by
the First Amendment. 205
The Pickering analysis for post-speech punishment affords
employers latitude to manage workplace-disruptive speech of low value
to the public, while at the same time enabling true whistleblowers to

198. Grutzmacher v. Howard County, 851 F.3d 332, 338 (4th Cir. 2017) (finding that fire
department battalion chief was lawfully disciplined for Facebook posts including an anti-gun-control
rant fantasizing about “beating a liberal to death” and, after being reprimanded, a defiant follow-up
post with a photo of an upraised middle finger directed to the fire chief).
199. Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2008).
200. Tindle v. Caudell, 56 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 1995).
201. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004).
202. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
203. Id. at 424.
204. Morales v. Jones, 494 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2007).
205. Id. at 597. Notably, the Seventh Circuit did find that the officer engaged in protected speech
by testifying in a civil lawsuit, which was not an assigned professional duty, even though the
testimony included information learned in the course of duty. Id. at 598.
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vindicate their rights if punished for high-value speech. 206 The Third
Circuit made this observation in invalidating a prior restraint limiting
expert testimony by police officers; if some subset of expert testimony
undermines the employer’s interests (such as a police ballistics expert
testifying that he believes ballistics evidence is worthless), “the balancing
process can be performed more satisfactorily after the speech has
occurred, when both its usefulness and its impact can be more accurately
assessed.” 207 The Pickering level of speech-specific disciplinary authority
has proven to be a workable and adaptable standard that balances the
employer’s and employees’ interests, without the need to resort to
categorical prior restraints.
VII. PRIOR RESTRAINTS DO NOT SERVE OR PROTECT: A WAY
FORWARD
Perhaps the most famous whistleblower story in modern U.S. history
is that of New York City police detective Frank Serpico, whose life was
dramatized in a 1973 Hollywood motion picture starring Al Pacino. 208
After refusing to accept a bribe offer, Serpico became aware that bribery
was a widespread problem within the New York Police Department,
winked at by superiors, which could compromise the integrity of the
police force. 209 He complained through internal channels and ultimately
gave incriminating testimony before a confidential grand jury proceeding,
but the grand jury failed to indict any of the culpable higher-ups. 210 So
Serpico did what the rules of many police departments categorize as a
punishable disciplinary offense: He told his story to a New York Times
206. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1202 (3d Cir. 1988) (ruling in favor of
disciplined police officer’s First Amendment challenge for sharing concerns with newspaper reporter
about racial animus within her department: “[W]hen a public employee participates in an interview
sought by a news reporter on a matter of public concern, the employee is engaged in the exercise of a
first amendment right to freedom of speech, even though the employee may have a personal stake in
the substance of the interview.”); Solomon v. Royal Oak Twp., 842 F.2d 862 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding
that police officer who made comments to newspaper alleging cronyism, favoritism and sexual
harassment by his supervisor was unlawfully fired in retaliation for constitutionally protected speech,
because corruption in law enforcement is a matter of public interest); Broderick v. Roache, 767 F.
Supp. 20 (D. Mass. 1991) (applying Pickering and concluding that Boston Police Department violated
police union leader’s First Amendment rights by punishing him for speech to the news media
addressing “crumbling” officer morale, political meddling by mayor’s administration, and other
issues of public concern).
207. Swartzwelder v. McNeilly, 297 F.3d 228, 241 (3d Cir. 2002).
208. S ERPICO (Artists Entertainment Complex 1973).
209. Roberta Ann Johnson, Whistleblowing and the Police, 3 R UTGERS U. J.L. & URB. P OL’Y
74, 77 (2006).
210. Id. at 78.
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reporter. 211 A drumbeat of front-page publicity did what the internal
complaint process could not: It forced New York’s mayor to appoint a
commission of inquiry, the Knapp Commission, that compiled a jawdropping investigative report cataloguing the extent to which organized
crime and drug dealers had bought off police to protect their illicit
operations. 212 Plainly, no supervisor in the New York Police Department
would have given Serpico approval to speak to the Times if he had asked.
The Serpico case underscores why journalists need access to rank-and-file
police officers, not just to spokespeople who are paid to burnish the
agency’s reputation.
It would be naïve to believe that police department media policies
are the only, or even the primary, reason that officers refrain from publicly
exposing problems within their departments. Powerful peer pressure
forces deter officers from ratting out their compatriots. 213 Still, the
existence of a formal, on-the-books policy against whistleblowing lends
official legitimacy to what should be considered a shameful and archaic
feature of police culture. Law enforcement agencies avidly encourage
civilian witnesses to speak out, so police officers, too, should be told: “If
you see something, say something.” 214
The fear of retaliation is no abstraction. High-profile instances
demonstrate that, equipped with the authority to silence or retaliate against
speakers, some police supervisors will take the invitation. When Officer
Ike Lambert of the Chicago Police Department attempted to report
discrepancies between a fellow officer’s report on the shooting of an
unarmed man versus eyewitness testimony and video evidence, he was

211. Id.
212. Adam Walinsky, The Knapp Connection, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 1, 1973, at 21.
https://www.villagevoice.com/2020/01/25/the-knapp-connection// [https://perma.cc/RK9H-5JUN].
213. Johnson, supra note 2011, at 76–77 (“The nature of police work [] helps [] define the
group. . . . One of the most respected tenets of the group is loyalty. Loyalty is exacted with a code of
honor that requires officers not to ‘snitch on,’ ‘rat out,’ or turn in other officers.”); Jerome H. Skolnick,
Corruption and the Blue Code of Silence, 3 P OLICE P RAC. & R ES. 7, 8 (2002) (“[T]he unique demands
that are placed on police officers, such as the threat of danger as well as scrutiny by the public,
generate a tightly woven environment conducive to the development of feelings of loyalty. The refusal
to report misconduct to proper authorities, or to falsely claim no knowledge of misconduct, is a
common manifestation of these sentiments.”); see also Alison L. Patton, The Endless Cycle of Abuse:
Why 42 U.S.C. 1983 Is Ineffective in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 763 (1993)
(quoting an ACLU police practices specialist’s observation that police will even lie under oath at trial
to protect each other because officers “depend on each other in life and death situations”).
214. DEP’T OF HOMELAND S EC., IF YOU S EE S OMETHING, S AY S OMETHING, https://
www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something/about-campaign [https://perma.cc/CB4N-BE99]; see
Skolnick, supra note 215, at 11–12 (discussing how fear of retribution by co-workers discourages
police whistleblowing).
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quickly demoted. 215 New Jersey Police Sergeant Kamil Warraich was
placed on medical leave and forced to undergo psychological evaluations
in response to his allegations of racism, excessive force, and missing files
in his department. 216 Warraich had previously been suspended for “misuse
of public property” after he used department letterhead to report his
concerns to prosecutors. 217
Law enforcement agencies might argue that officers need not elevate
their concerns to the public and press, because they have the recourse of
complaining internally through the chain of command. But as Frank
Serpico’s experience dramatizes—and hundreds of less-publicized cases
confirm—the complaint process is not always effective. 218 One critic has
called the internal affairs process “an irresponsible and, frankly, farcical
method of responding to misconduct claims.” 219 Further, “the entire
process is concealed from the public,” so if an officer receives repeat
opportunities to evade responsibility for wrongdoing, the public may
never find out—unless someone within the system speaks up. 220 If a
whistleblower’s objective is to warn the public about a potentially
dangerous person on the police force, filing an internal affairs complaint
that will likely never see the light of day is an ineffective way of achieving
that objective. Speaking publicly should be understood as a supplement to
the internal affairs process that helps ensure the process’s effectiveness:
If the complaint is not taken seriously, the complainant can do as Frank
Serpico did and escalate the matter to a higher court—the court of public
opinion.
In addition to the increasingly well-documented problem of
overzealous force against people of color, police agencies have become

215. Musa al-Gharbi, Police Punish the ‘Good Apples,’ ATLANTIC (July 1, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/what-police-departments-do-whistleblowers/613687/ [https://perma.cc/9UML-SF5F].
216. S.P. Sullivan, Why Don’t More Cops Speak Out About Alleged Misconduct? Look What
Happened to One Who Tried, NJ. COM (Nov. 1, 2020, 7:11 AM), https://www.nj.com/news/2020/
11/why-dont-more-cops-speak-out-about-alleged-misconduct-look-what-happened-to-one-whotried.html [https://perma.cc/KKG7-9DJS].
217. Id.
218. See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. R EV. 453, 538 (2004) (observing that, because the internal affairs process is purely punitive and
not designed to produce systemic improvements, “internal review, at least as it currently exists, is
unlikely to be a very effective vehicle for widespread policy or organizational change”); see also id.
at 537 n.523 (quoting statistics that show only 13 percent of internal affairs proceedings result in a
finding of guilt against the accused officer, raising questions about the processes’ objectivity).
219. Rachel Moran, Ending the Internal Affairs Farce, 64 B UFF. L. R EV. 837, 844 (2016).
220. See Patton, supra note 215, at 787 (commenting that secrecy of internal affairs proceedings
is a factor in allowing repeat abusers to re-offend).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol55/iss1/1

44

LoMonte and Terkovich: Your Have the Duty to Remain Silent

2022]

YOU HAVE THE DUTY TO R EMAIN S ILENT

45

known as harbors for sexual harassment 221 and racial hostility and
discrimination. 222 If journalists are limited to speaking with the agency
head, the agency’s public relations spokesperson, or an officer handpicked
by the public relations office, the stories of people experiencing adversity
within the workplace will go untold. An officer who is already
experiencing harassment or discrimination will understandably hesitate to
escalate the situation publicly at an agency that makes unauthorized
statements a punishable disciplinary offense.
When rank-and-file officers cannot be heard, at times the only voice
speaking for police is that of labor unions. But union representatives do
not always represent the diverse and nuanced perspectives of their
members, nor can they; it is the union’s role to be assertive advocates in
their member’s defense, even in questionable cases. 223 Silencing the

221. See Somvadee Chaiyavej & Merry Morash, Reasons for Policewomen’s Assertive and
Passive Reactions to Sexual Harassment, 12 P OLICE Q. 63, 71 (2009) (reporting findings of interviews
with 117 female officers from five midwestern law enforcement agencies: “90.6 percent reported at
least one experience of harassment by a male officer in their organization within the past 2 years.”);
Sue Carter Collins, Sexual Harassment and Police Discipline: Who’s Policing the Police?, 27
P OLICING: INT’L J. P OLICE S TRATEGIES & MGMT. 512, 512 (2004) (commenting that “there is
overwhelming evidence that sexual aggression by male officers against female officers remains
unchecked”).
222. See Andrea Shalal & Jonathan Landay, Black Cops Say Discrimination, Nepotism Behind
U.S. Police Race Gap, R EUTERS (July 2, 2020, 1:28 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usminneapolis-police-blackofficers/black-cops-say-discrimination-nepotism-behind-u-s-police-racegap-idUSKBN2432T8 [https://perma.cc/DC2W-QG3H] (quoting National Black Police
Association’s observation that “Black recruits face nepotism, more problems during background
checks, greater barriers to promotion and higher discipline rates once hired”); Dan Frosch & Ben
Chapman, Black Officers Say Discrimination Abounds, Complicating Reform Efforts, WALL S T. J.
(June 16, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/for-black-police-discrimination-aboundscomplicating-reform-efforts-11592299800 [https://perma.cc/A296-3WGW] (“[B]lack officers across
the country say they commonly face harassment, discrimination and even abuse from their own
departments.”); see also Kimberly D. Hassell & Steven G. Brandl, An Examination of the Workplace
Experiences of Police Patrol Officers: The Role of Race, Sex, and Sexual Orientation, 12 P OLICE Q.
408, 418–21 (2009) (reporting that African-American police officers and Latina officers experience
“significantly higher levels of stress” than white male officers, and that African-American male
officers “report significantly more negative workplace experiences” than their white peers, including
vandalism or theft of their equipment, exposure to vulgar language, and lack of opportunity for
advancement).
223. See Samantha Michaels, The Infuriating History of Why Police Unions Have So Much
Power, MOTHER JONES (Sept./Oct. 2020), https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2020/
08/police-unions-minneapolis/ [https://perma.cc/43AM-CKNF] (quoting head of Minneapolis police
union who opposed firing of Officer Derek Chauvin even after he was videotaped smothering a man
to death, and called for violence against protesters he described as a “terrorist movement”); William
Finnegan, How Police Unions Fight Reform, NEW YORKER (July 27, 2020), https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/08/03/how-police-unions-fight-reform
[https://perma.cc/NS59-SXTR] (explaining how New York’s police union continued to defend the
officer who killed street merchant Eric Garner in 2014 by asphyxiating him in a choke-hold while

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron,

45

Akron Law Review, Vol. 55 [], Iss. 1, Art. 1

46

AKRON LAW R EVIEW

[55:1

knowledgeable voices of police officers can leave the public with a
distorted and incomplete set of extreme perspectives: the employer’s and
the union’s. News organizations are under increasing pressure to diversify
the sources they quote so that the voices appearing in the media are
reflective of the full range of the community. 224 But when journalists are
limited to speaking only to the head of the law enforcement agency or
police union, that person is highly likely to be a middle-aged white man. 225
Even acknowledging that there is a range of potentially harmful
speech that law enforcement agencies can legitimately regulate, that still
leaves a wide swath of speech in which officers can harmlessly engage:
Providing basic factual information to journalists about newsworthy
events, sharing personal experiences and observations, and addressing the
full range of civic issues on which any community member might have an
opinion. If a police department policy does not clearly leave leeway for
this benign speech, then the policy is overly broad and likely
unconstitutional.
Gag policies present two distinct types of problems for the flow of
information. First, they can prevent the public and press from receiving
arresting him for a petty offense, even after it came to light that the officer had a high number of
substantiated prior complaints on his record).
224. See Katica Roy, There’s a Gender Crisis in Media, and It’s Threatening Our democracy,
F AST C O. (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90401548/theres-a-gender-crisis-inmedia-and-its-threatening-our-democracy [https://perma.cc/CMN7-GW8E] (noting that Bloomberg
business news organization has made strides in diversifying coverage, but that women still make up
only 18 percent of experts quoted on-air and 10 percent of experts quoted in front-page news stories);
Jeanine Santucci, Opinion, Source Diversity at NPR: Grassroots Initiatives Address Challenges, NPR
(July 24, 2018, 4:49 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/publiceditor/2018/07/24/631964116/sourcediversity-at-npr-grassroots-initiatives-address-challenges [https://perma.cc/JY6T-U4D5] (noting that
sources interviewed on NPR flagship programs were “overwhelmingly white, male and coastal,” with
men making up 70 percent of the interviewees and white people making up 73 percent); Adrienne
LaFrance, I Analyzed a Year of My Reporting for Gender Bias (Again), ATLANTIC (Feb. 17, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/02/gender-diversity-journalism/463023/
[https://perma.cc/F8T3-ETVL] (“Women represent about half the global population, and yet they’re
dramatically underrepresented in stories meant to help people understand much of the complexity in
the world.”).
225. Federal statistics reflect that, as of 2013, 78% of full-time sworn personnel in sheriffs ’
offices were white, 11% were Hispanic, 9% were black, and 2% were members of other minority
groups. DOJ, B UREAU OF JUST. S TAT., NCJ 249757, S HERIFF’S OFFICE P ERSONNEL, 1993–2013
(2016). But 92% of sheriffs are white and 90% are male, according to a June 2020 study. WOMEN
DONORS NETWORK, C ONFRONTING THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF P OWER: AMERICA’S S HERIFFS, at 4
(2020). The nonprofit Marshall Project has likewise found that the people who run police unions are,
overwhelmingly, white men. See Eli Hager & Weihua Li, A Major Obstacle to Police Reform: The
Whiteness of Their Union Bosses, MARSHALL P ROJECT (June 10, 2020 6:00 AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/06/10/a-major-obstacle-to-police-reform-the-whiteness of-their-union-bosses [https://perma.cc/P58F-5JKH] (“Of the 15 largest departments in which a
majority of officers are people of color, only one, Memphis, has a union leader who is black.”).
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timely information about crimes to which police respond by limiting
authority to answer questions to a single public affairs spokesperson or
the chief of the department, which creates a chokepoint, delaying the flow
of information. Second, they can inhibit employees from sharing personal
opinions and observations that are informed by their professional
experiences, which is exactly the type of speech that the Supreme Court
has recognized as societally valuable. 226
Longstanding business-as-usual assumptions about policing are
being revisited as disturbing discoveries come to light. It has become
common knowledge that police officers give false testimony so regularly
that the practice has a nickname—testilying 227 —and that prosecutors are
forced to maintain lists of untrustworthy officers to avoid calling as
witnesses. 228 In response to these concerns, states are revisiting laws that
afford special job protections to police, 229 opening long-concealed records
of misconduct complaints for public inspection, 230 and restricting the use
of chokeholds and other dangerous tactics. 231 But these reforms will be
incomplete so long as both the written law of policing and its unwritten
culture restrain officers from speaking candidly about their work.
226. See Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 240 (2014) (“[O]ur precedents dating back to Pickering
have recognized that speech by public employees on subject matter related to their employment holds
special value precisely because those employees gain knowledge of matters of public concern through
their employment.”); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006) (“The Court has acknowledged
the importance of promoting the public’s interest in receiving the well-informed views of government
employees engaging in civic discussion.”); see also Michael L. Wells, Section 1983, the First
Amendment, and Public Employee Speech: Shaping the Right to Fit the Remedy (and Vice Versa), 35
GA. L. R EV. 939, 995 (2001) (commenting that “a rule that all statements about the job are unprotected
would undermine the value of free speech in the employment context”).
227. Joseph Goldstein,’Testilying’ by Police: A Stubborn Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/18/nyregion/testilying-police-perjury-new-york.html
[https://perma.cc/9UTC-R5GJ].
228. Steve Reilly & Mark Nichols, Hundreds of Police Officers Have Been Labeled Liars. Some
Still Help Send People to Prison, USA TODAY (Dec. 16, 2019, 9:02 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/investigations/2019/10/14/brady-lists-police-officersdishonest-corrupt-still-testify-investigation-database/2233386001/ [https://perma.cc/6H7Y-AZYS].
229. Ben Leonard, Maryland Becomes First State to Repeal Police Bill of Rights, Overriding
Hogan
Veto, P OLITICO (Apr.
10, 2021, 6:19 PM), https://www.politico.com/
news/2021/04/10/maryland-repeals-police-bill-of-rights-overriding-hogan-veto-480731
[https://perma.cc/YR42-8W6T].
230. Ellen Moynihan, Denis Slattery & Chris Sommerfeldt, Cuomo Signs Historic 50-a Repeal
Bill, Making N.Y. Police Disciplinary Records Public After Decades of Secrecy, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(June 12, 2020, 4:58 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ny-cuomo-police-reformdisciplinary-records-20200612-5zryohkuwjew7ksjowhtswmsk4-story.html [https://perma.cc/8AJ9YW3W].
231. Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Washington State Enacts Police Reform a Year After George
Floyd’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/19/us/washingtoninslee-police-reform.html [https://perma.cc/NQA9-7FDM].
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Litigation is unlikely to provide a solution for two reasons. First,
there is no indication that decades worth of court rulings have made any
lasting impression on law enforcement agencies. Even after being
successfully sued two decades ago for restricting officers’ free speech
rights, 232 the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police still has one of the nation’s most
repressive speech policies, requiring pre-approval for all comments to the
media. 233 Second, litigation is relatively rare, and facial challenges are
even rarer. A police officer is unlikely to be so motivated to give an
interview as to get legal counsel and file suit. Opportunities to speak to
the media are situational and time-sensitive. An officer might be
approached for an interview only a few times over the course of a career.
An officer who is denied permission to speak will not be able to obtain
judicial redress in time for the interview to be newsworthy. The rare
officer who is motivated to sue will almost invariably be an officer who
has suffered serious disciplinary sanctions, so that the relationship with
the employer is already broken. And disciplinary action is often based on
the content of a specific remark (triggering an “as-applied” Pickering
analysis) as opposed to the decision to accept the interview (which would
set up a facial NTEU challenge). For these reasons, progress is unlikely
unless policymakers codify First Amendment principles both in law and
in police culture.
Police officers have a right to speak, and to speak out, but the public
also has a right to hear. One of the foundational principles of the American
police system is that police power comes from the public’s consent and
approval. 234 Much of day-to-day policing business remains largely out of
the public eye, and oversight, even within departments, is limited because
of the job’s independent nature. 235 Supervising officers and the public
alike are not able to oversee every officer all of the time, especially when
they are out on patrol. Though recent inventions, such as the use of body
cameras, allow supervisors and the public to monitor officers who are out
232. Swartzwelder v. McNeilly, 297 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2002).
233. P ITTSBURGH B UREAU OF P OLICE, ORDER NO. 65-1, MEDIA P OLICY (2015).
234. Debo P. Adegbile, Policing Through an American Prism, 126 YALE L.J. 2222, 2228 (2017);
see also Vincent Nguyen, Watching Big Brother: A Citizen’s Right to Record Police, 28 F ORDHAM
INTELL. P ROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 637, 669 (2018) (“The impact of distrust between police officers
and society is significant, resulting in decreased compliance with and trust of law enforcement. It is
possible to build trust through transparent information sharing. Transparency not only minimizes
distrust of law enforcement but also allows for increased cooperation in civil society.”).
235. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Auditors and the Fourth Amendment: Data with the Power
to Inspire Political Action, 66 LAW & C ONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 238 (2003) (observing that transparency
of information about law enforcement “is critical to deterrence precisely because the police so often
operate under a code of silence. They often work alone or in small teams, exercising wide discretion
in the use of force or its threat to ferret out crime.”).
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on patrol, oversight remains limited. 236 Any argument that police should
have diminished free speech rights because of the sensitive, life-and-death
nature of their jobs ignores the countervailing concern that the public’s
First Amendment right to receive information is at its highest when lifeand-death decisions are at issue. 237
Placing overbroad and preemptive limits on officer speech harms
both police officers and the public. Law enforcement officers have
information that the public would benefit from hearing, whether that is
information external to the department (such as details about crimes
affecting public safety) or internal to the department (such as concerns
about agency policies, practices, or working conditions). The courts have
overwhelmingly sent the message that broad prior restraints on public
employee speech are unconstitutional, even if those who run law
enforcement agencies are operating in apparent denial that this body of
precedent exists. Even if police rulebooks are rewritten to acknowledge
the constitutionally protected right to speak, the culture of policing will
not magically transform overnight. But without that authoritative
acknowledgment as a starting point, the urgent work of remaking
policing’s culture will remain unfinished.

236. See Jake Bleiberg, Value of Police Body Cameras Limited by Lack of Transparency,
ASSOCIATED
P RESS
(June
16,
2020),
https://apnews.com/article/99a772c44f58cde3 6
dc33c91c4ee72de [https://perma.cc/H27F-GP5T] (quoting civil rights technologist’s opinion that
“[c]ameras have largely failed to deliver swift accountability because the release of video is frequently
long delayed or denied entirely”).
237. See David L. Hudson, Jr., First Amendment Right to Receive Information and Ideas Justifies
Citizens’ Videotaping of the Police, 10 U. S T. THOMAS J.L. & P UB. POL’Y 89, 93 (2016) (arguing that
First Amendment right to receive information should be understood to include a right to videotape
police officers conducting official business: “The public has a right to know how its police perform.”);
see also Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. R EV. 1107, 1120 (2000) (“[A] step in the right
direction, toward a more democratic conception of discretion and a level of trust in government,
requires systematic visibility of policing decisions and concomitant justifications. In other words,
official intentions and actions should be transparent to the public: The electorate should be able to
observe and scrutinize the substantive and procedural policy choices of criminal law enforcement.”).
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